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IY 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is derived from Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2. 
V 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Does Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309 define a "significant" injury such that a 
person who meets the statutory threshold of § 31 A-22-309 is entitled to recover more than 
"nominal damages?" 
2. Can a jury lawfully award no general damages to a victim of an accident whose 
special medical damages exceed the statutory threshold for serious injury established by 
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it allowed Dr. Clarke to testify at 
trial as an expert witness? 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it allowed Dr. France to testify at 
trial as an expert witness? 
5. Did the trial court err when it determined that plaintiffs' treating doctor, Dr. 
Gordon McClean, could not give his opinion on causation because he did not provide an 
expert report under Rule 26(a)(3)(B)? 
6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it struck testimony of the treating 
physician, Dr. McClean, which was elicited without objection, and then gave an 
instruction to the jury to disregard such testimony? 
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7. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in requiring redaction of references to the 
source of injuries from the treating physician's medical records prior to admitting them? 
Issues one, two and five are questions of law, and are reviewed for correctness. 
Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, (Utah 1998); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
Issues three and four are questions left to the discretion of the trial court and are 
determined by an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Pena, supra. 
Issues six and seven are mixed issues of law and fact which are examined for 
correctness because they were based upon the court's erroneous interpretation of Rule 
26(a)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. Pena, Id. 
These issues were preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs' Motions in Limine and 
supporting memoranda filed December 30, 2004, R. 114-203; in objections to the 
testimony of Dr. France and Dr. Clarke made at trial, R. 774 at 125, 133, 137-165, 190; R. 
775 at 47-48, 52-53, 57; in plaintiffs' opposition to defendants' Motion in Limine 
regarding Dr. McClean's testimony made at trial, R. 773 at 38-55; in objections to the 
court's sustaining defendants' objection to testimony of Dr. McClean from his records, the 
striking of such testimony, the giving of a curative instruction, and the requirement that 
references to treatment for injuries caused by the collision be redacted from Dr. McClean's 
records. R. 773 at 133-148. 
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VI 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309. 
2. Rule 26(a)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
VII 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellants, Sergio Pruneda and Iris Pruneda, as parent and guardian of Anthony 
Guererro, Donovan Guererro1, Sergio Pruneda, Jr., Cozy Pruneda, Matthew Pruneda, and 
Zennia Pruneda (hereinafter "the Prunedas"), each brought an action for negligence. They 
claimed the Appellee, Richard D. Gray (hereinafter "Gray"), negligently drove a Dodge 
Durango, owned by his employer, Columbia Steel Casting Company (hereinafter 
"Columbia"), into the back of the Prunedas' car. Sergio Pruneda filed an action, case 
number 030402552. Iris Pruneda, as guardian for the children filed a separate action, case 
number 030403709. The two actions were consolidated on December 15, 2003, by order 
of the trial court. R. 56. 
1
 Anthony and Donovan were born before Sergio and Iris were married, but are 
family members and also known as Anthony and Donovan Pruneda. 
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The force of the collision caused the Pruneda car to shoot forward into the rear of a 
Nova driven by Mr. Perez. The force knocked the Perez car through the intersection. 
Columbia was named as a defendant because Gray was acting in the course of his 
employment. Columbia does not dispute the claim. 
The accident happened on State Street (highway 89) and 300 East in Pleasant 
Grove, Utah on July 31, 2002. Sergio Pruneda and the Pruneda children all received 
injuries in the collision. They were treated briefly at a clinic in Linden, Utah through 
August 12, 2002. They began treatment with Dr. Gordon McClean on August 14, 2002. 
Dr. McClean first examined Sergio and his children on August 14, 2002. He 
diagnosed neck and back injuries. He treated Sergio until December 30, 2002. Two of the 
children, Matthew and Zennia reached maximum medical improvement ("MMI") by 
December 9, 2002 and were released. The other four children, Anthony and Donovan 
Guererro and Cozy and Sergio, Jr. reached MMI in May of 2003, and were released. 
Gray and Columbia claim that the collision did not significantly injure Sergio or 
his children. There was no claim at trial regarding any pre-existing injuries. 
Prior to trial, defendants hired Dr. Jayne Clarke to render opinions on the question 
of whether or not the treatment received by Sergio and his children was reasonable and 
necessary, and whether Sergio and the children had suffered any injuries in the collision. 
R. 104. Dr. Clarke never examined Sergio or any of his children. R. 775 at 90. 
The Prunedas filed a Motion in Limine with accompanying Memorandum on 
December 30, 2004, asking the Court to preclude testimony by Dr. Clarke on the issue of 
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reasonableness of the treatment provided by Dr. McClean. R. 115-163. Plaintiffs claimed 
Dr. Clarke, an M.D., lacked the necessary training and experience to opine on the 
reasonableness and necessity of the chiropractic care provided by Dr. McClean. Prunedas' 
Motion in Limine was denied. R. 465. Dr. Clarke was allowed to testify at trial regarding 
the care and treatment rendered by Dr. McClean. R. 775 at 26-131. 
Prior to trial, Gray and Columbia hired Dr. Paul France to render opinions on the 
impact speed of the Durango striking the Pruneda car, and the forces generated in the 
collision. R. 104. 
On December 30, 2004, the Prunedas filed a Motion in Limine to preclude 
testimony by Dr. France, claiming the methodology he used to reach his conclusions was 
untested, unreliable, and had never been shown to produce accurate replicable results. In 
addition, even if the methodology was reliable, there was insufficient evidence in this case 
to allow him to reach a reliable conclusion. The Court denied the motion, but said a 
hearing would be held at trial to determine whether there was sufficient foundation to 
allow Dr. France to render his opinions. R. 463-66. 
The case was tried to a jury for four days beginning April 17, 2006. The hearing to 
consider the foundation for Dr. France's testimony was held on April 19, 2006. Dr. France 
testified to lay a foundation for his opinions regarding impact speeds and forces generated 
in the collision. R. 774 at 112-166. He described the methodology used to reach his 
conclusions. R. 774 at 113-135. He examined the repair estimates for the Durango and the 
LeBaron, and color photographs of damage to the LeBaron. Based thereon, and using 
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barrier crash data, Dr. France opined the Durango was traveling at 9-12 miles per hour at 
the time of the collision. R. 774 at 128-133. 
The court allowed the Prunedas to examine Dr. France on the issue of whether he 
was qualified to render such opinions. R. 774 at 136-164. Following the testimony of Dr. 
France, Id. at 113-165, the court ruled that there was sufficient foundation to allow Dr. 
France to testify. R. 774 at 165-66. Prunedas objected to all of the opinions rendered by 
Dr. France at the trial. R. 774 at 190. Specifically, the Prunedas objected that Dr. France 
could not establish that his methodology was reliable or had ever been shown by scientific 
testing to generate accurate results. Prunedas claimed he had insufficient information to 
reconstruct the collision even were the methodology reliable. R. 165; R. 774 at 136-164. 
In his testimony at trial, Dr. France stated his methods were based upon accepted 
theories of conservation of energy. R. 774 at 121-22, 129-132. In other words, the impact 
speed (energy) of the Durango must equal the energy used up in damage to the LeBaron 
and the Nova, and the energy used to move the LeBaron and the Nova. R. 774 at 142-43. 
All of the energy must be accounted for. R. 774 at 141-43. However, Dr. France had no 
damage estimates or photographs depicting the damage to the Nova. Id.; R. 774 at 214. 
He admitted he could not accurately reconstruct the accident without the damage data on 
the Nova. Id. He knows energy was transferred to the Nova, but could not tell how much. 
Id. His calculations were made without any crush data on the Nova. R. 774 at 216-17. He 
admitted that he could not calculate the impact speed without the Delta V (impact energy). 
R. 774 at 222. Therefore, he simply rendered an educated guess. R. 774 at 222-23. 
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Dr. France admitted his analysis was simply an "educated guess" about the speed at 
impact R. 774 at 145-47. He said, when using damage photographs and estimates to get 
the crush of the cars for use in reconstruction, all of the damage must be known. R. 774 at 
147. But he didn't know all of the damage to the LeBaron or the Nova. R. 774 at 141-49. 
He admitted the less you know about the damage, the more you must estimate, resulting in 
greater error. R. 774 at 149-150. 
Dr. France admitted his methodology to reconstruct this accident has never been 
tested and peer reviewed for accuracy2. R. 774 at 226-27. There have never been any 
studies that establish the error rate for his methodology. R. 774 at 161; 226-27, and it has 
never been shown to produce reliable conclusions as to actual impact speeds or the forces 
generated in an accident. Id. 
Exhibit 13 was the only published article produced at trial that had any application 
to Dr. France's methodology. The testing described in Exhibit 13 showed such a wide 
range of speed estimates using pictures of damage to estimate speed, that it was obvious 
that this method was unreliable. R. 774 at 227-231, Exhibit 13 at 9-10. Dr. France's 
methodology has been created solely for litigation purposes and is only used by him for 
that purpose. R. 774 at 163. 
2While he admitted there have never been peer reviewed studies which 
demonstrate that accurate results can be obtained using his methodology, Dr. France did 
claim that Exhibit 11, which was produced during the foundational hearing, demonstrates 
that his methodology produces accurate results. R. 774 at 155:8-161. A careful review of 
Exhibit 11 fails to demonstrate such a claim. 
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Notwithstanding the failure of defendants' counsel to establish a recognized 
scientific basis for the opinions of Dr. France, or that his methodology had ever been 
tested and shown to produce accurate results, the trial court determined that there was 
sufficient foundation to allow Dr. France to testify. R. 774 at 165-66. 
Plaintiffs also objected to the lack of foundation for Dr. Clarke's testimony. She 
said the Prunedas received too much chiropractic treatment and that there was no objective 
evidence to support the need for the care rendered by Dr. McClean. R. 775 at 26-65. But 
Dr. Clarke never examined Sergio or his children. R. 775 at 90. Notwithstanding, the trial 
court allowed Dr. Clarke to testify there was no documentation of any injuries to the 
children and too much chiropractic care. R. 775 at 47-52, 57, 60-65. 
At the beginning of trial, defendants filed a Motion in Limine asking the court to 
preclude Dr. McClean from giving medical opinions on the cause of the Pruneda injuries 
he treated. R. 489-503. The basis for the motion was the claim that the Prunedas had not 
filed a Rule 26(a)(3)(B) report regarding Dr. McClean. 
Dr. McClean was the treating doctor for the Prunedas. R. 773 at 63. He was not 
specifically hired as an expert as that term is used in Rule 26(a)(3)(B). On July 12, 2004, 
the Prunedas filed an expert designation with the court pursuant to the requirements of 
Rule 26(a)(3)(A), and stated that Dr. McClean would be offering opinions under Rule 702 
at trial. R. 80. Although Dr. McClean was not specifically retained as an expert, the notice 
said he would give opinions about the treatment he rendered to the Prunedas. Id. 
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Dr. McClean had made specific notations in his records regarding the fact that the 
treatment he rendered was for injuries received in the July 31, 2002 collision. E.g. R. 773 
at 96, 111, 127-28; R. 780-86. Defendants deposed Dr. McClean on September 21, 2004 
with respect to his treatment and his medical records. R. 99. They had ample opportunity 
at that time to inquire about his opinions and the basis therefor. 
The court granted the Motion in Limine, and said Dr. McClean could not express 
his opinion on the cause of injuries, because he didn't provide an expert report pursuant to 
Rule 26(a)(3)(B). R. 543-44. The court said it would allow admission of his medical 
records, but said Dr. McClean could not be asked any questions regarding causation of the 
injuries. R. 773 at 38-54. 
At trial, Dr. McClean testified and read excerpts from his records without objection. 
Included were statements that Donovan, Anthony and Cozy reached maximum medical 
improvement for injuries received in the July 31, 2002 collision and were released from 
care.R. 773 at 96, 111,127-28. 
Subsequently, while testifying about his treatment of Matthew Pruneda, Dr. 
McClean was asked to read a similar entry from his medical records. R. 773 at 133. The 
defendants objected, and the court sustained the objection. Id. The ruling was based upon 
the court's in limine ruling that Dr. McClean was not allowed to testify about the cause of 
the injuries he had treated. R. 733 at 133-145. 
The court then struck Dr. McClean's prior testimony respecting his release of 
Donovan, Anthony and Cozy from care for injuries received in the collision, even though 
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the testimony was given without objection. R. 773 at 96, 111, 127-28. The jury was told to 
disregard all prior testimony of Dr. McClean regarding causation.3 R. 773 at 140-41. In 
addition, the court ruled that all references to causation of the injuries must be redacted 
from the medical records of Dr. McClean. R. 773 at 144-48. Thus, the medical records 
submitted to the jury had all of the references to the reason for treatment redacted.4 R. 781 
at 21; 782 at 20; 784 at 19; 785 at 15. 
At the close of testimony, the matter was submitted to the jury on special 
interrogatories. In answering the interrogatories, the jury found that Gray was negligent, 
and that his negligence was a proximate cause of injury to Sergio and his children. The 
jury then found that the special damages suffered by Sergio and his children were: Sergio, 
$4,762.07; Anthony, $220.00; Donovan, $220.00; Sergio, Jr., $220.00; Cozy, $220.00; 
Matthew, $220.00; and Zennia, $220.00. Sergio was awarded no general damages. R. 
703. 
The Prunedas objected to the finding of no general damages and asked the trial 
court to send the jury out again with instructions that general damages must be awarded to 
Sergio. R. 570-72; 775 at 284-290. The court refused and dismissed the jury. The 
Prunedas objected. R. 570-72; 775 at 284-290. 
On May 30, 2006, judgment was entered on the jury verdict. R. 770. Notice of 
Appeal was filed on June 23, 2006. R. 772. 
3The instruction given by the court is set forth at R. 773 at 140:24-141:6. 
4Appendix Exhibit 5 contains the original pages which were redacted by the court. 
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B. Statement of Facts 
1. On July 31, 2002, the parties were in a three car accident. R. 774 at 8,12-13. 
2. Gray's car rear ended Sergio Pruneda's car. R. 274 at 12. 
3. Sergio Pruneda and his six children were in the car. R. 274 at 9-10. 
4. The force of the collision pushed the Pruneda car forward into a Chevrolet Nova 
driven by Mr. Perez. R. 274 at 12-13. 
5. The collision pushed the Perez car across the intersection. R. 775 at 13. 
6. Sergio and his six children were all injured. R. 274 at 63-64, Exhibits 1-7. 
7. On August 2, 2002, Sergio and his children went to the Total Health Institute in 
Lindon, Utah where they received chiropractic treatment until August 12, 2002. R. 274 at 
25, Exhibits 1-7. 
8. Total Health Institute billed $220.00 each for the care provided to the Pruneda 
children. Exhibits 1-7. 
9. Sergio and his children were dissatisfied with their treatment, and changed to the 
clinic of Dr. Gordon McClean in Provo, Utah. R. 773 at 26-27. 
10. Dr. McClean first examined the Prunedas on August 14, 2002. Id.; Exhibits 1-7. 
11. Dr. McClean determined, from objective symptoms, that Sergio and each of the 
children had injuries from the accident which required treatment. R. 773 at 66-67, 86-88, 
101-02, 114-15, 124, 129-130, 152; Exhibits 1-7. 
12. Dr. McClean treated Sergio for his injuries from August 14, 2002 until 
December 30, 2002. R. 773 at 64-81; Exhibit 1. 
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13. Dr. McClean treated Donovan and Anthony Guerrero, Sergio Pruneda, Jr., and 
Cozy Pruneda for their injuries from August 14, 2002 until May 12, 2003. R. 773 at 83-
111,114-120, 123-28; Exhibits 2-5. 
14. Dr. McClean treated Matthew and Zennia Pruneda for their injuries from 
August 14, 2002 until December 9, 2002. R. 773 at 129-133, 151-57; Exhibits 6-7. 
15. Dr. McClean testified that he charged the sum of $6,207.57 to treat Sergio 
Pruneda, and $7,107.39 to treat Anthony Guererro, and $7,411.43 to treat Donovan 
Guererro, and $6,252.86 to treat Sergio Pruneda, Jr., and $4,835.73 to treat Cozy Pruneda, 
and $2,115.82 to treat Matthew Pruneda, and $1,999.20 to treat Zennia Pruneda. R. 773 at 
82, 100, 111, 120-21, 128, 150-51, 157-58; Ex.1-7. 
16. Dr. McClean testified that the sums charged for treating the Prunedas were fair 
and reasonable for the medical services provided. Id. 
17. Defendants hired Dr. France to testify at trial as an expert on the impact speed 
of the Gray car and the forces generated in the collision. R. 774 at 112-166. 
18. Dr. France said the Gray car was going 9-12 miles per hour at the time of 
impact. R. 774 at 133. 
19. Dr. France testified that based upon the range of impact speeds he had 
determined, the change in velocity of the Pruneda car generated in the collision was in the 
range of 6.5 to 9 g's. R. 774 at 134. 
20. Prior to reaching his conclusions, Dr. France did not examine any of the cars 
involved in the collision. R. 774 at 141. 
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21. The information relied upon by Dr. France consisted of verbal representations 
of the amount of damage to the Nova, a copy of the repair estimates on the Gray and 
Pruneda cars, and some photographs of the damage to the Gray and Pruneda cars, and 
crash test data from barrier collisions. R. 774 at 128-29. 
22. Dr. France admitted he had no crash barrier test data for the Nova, and had no 
reliable information on the amount of damage done to the Nova from which calculations 
could be made. R. 774 at 125, 139-140. 
23. Dr. France admitted on cross-examination there was frame damage to the 
LeBaron which did not show in the photographs, and that some of the LeBaron damage 
was not accounted for in the repair estimate. R. 774 at 139, 148-49. 
24. Dr. France also admitted he had no repair estimates or photographs of the Perez 
car. R. 774 at 125, 139-140. 
25. In reaching his conclusions, Dr. France relied upon crash test data involving 
cars that hit a barrier, a test performed under different circumstances, and which produces 
different damage than the damage produced when two cars collide. R. 774 at 122-23, 150, 
209-210,221-25. 
26. Dr. France admitted he never visited the scene of the collision and had not 
measured the distance across the intersection or the grade of the road at the collision site. 
R. 774 at 217-220. 
27. Dr. France said he relied on the estimate of Mr. Perez that his car traveled about 
30 feet after impact. Id. 
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28. Dr. France admitted that to do his calculation, he must account for all of the 
energy dissipated in the collision. R. 774 at 141:11-15. 
29. He also admitted he would need to know how much energy was absorbed by the 
Nova to obtain an accurate calculation. R. 774 at 141:16-142:2. 
30. Although he lacked information on the actual damage done to the Nova, he 
determined the damage by "thresholding." R. 774 at 142:3-10. 
31. Dr. France admitted he made an educated guess about the impact speed, 
because he lacked the data necessary to use momentum equations. R. 774 at 142-47, 220-
26. 
32. Dr. Jayne Clarke was hired as defendants medical expert and conducted only a 
medical records examination. R. 775 at 34-36. 
33. She never saw or examined any of the plaintiffs. Id. 
34. Over objection, the court allowed Dr. Clarke to testify that based upon Dr. 
France's findings, the forces in the collision were not sufficient to hurt someone. R. 775 at 
36-37. 
35. Over objection, Dr. Jayne Clarke was allowed to testify that Sergio was unable 
to provide a reasonable history to Dr. McClean. R. 775 at 46-48. 
36. Over objection, the court allowed Dr. Clarke to characterize and criticize the 
behavior of the Prunedas based solely upon her dissatisfaction with how Dr. McClean kept 
his medical records. R. 775 at 46-52. 
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37. Over Prunedas' motion to the contrary, the court allowed Dr. Clarke to criticize 
the chiropractic care rendered by Dr. McClean. R. 775 at 51-62. 
38. Dr. Clarke testified over objection, that in her opinion, Dr. McClean's treatment 
was unreasonable and exceeded that allowed by the CAD Protocols. R. 775 at 62-65. 
39. She testified she is not a Chiropractor and that Chiropractors are trained and 
practice under different theories than her medical specialty. R. 775 at 70-74. 
40. Dr. Clarke claimed she was very well versed on the CAD Protocols. R. 775 at 
68:24-69:4. 
41. However, the only familiarity Dr. Clarke had with the CAD Protocols was what 
she gained from a summary, source was unknown, which she obtained and reviewed 
between the date of her deposition and the date of trial. R. 775 at 81-84. 
42. At the close of the evidence the case was submitted to the jury. 
43. The jury found that Gray was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate 
cause of injury to the Prunedas. R. 703. 
44. The jury awarded $4,762.07 to Sergio Pruneda for special damages and $220.00 
to each of the children for special damages. Id. 
45. The jury awarded no general damages. Id. 
46. Plaintiffs told the court that the jury could not legally fail to award general 
damages to Sergio Pruneda, and asked the court to give an additional instruction to the 
jury. R. 704; R. 775 at 284-290. 
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47. The Prunedas asked the court to send the jury out again to deliberate on general 
damages. Id. 
48. The court refused and dismissed the jury over the objection of the Prunedas. R. 
775 at 284-290. 
49. Judgment on the jury verdict was entered on May 30,2006. R. 770. 
50. Notice of Appeal was filed June 23, 2006. R. 772. 
VIII 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO SEND THE JURY FOR 
FURTHER DELIBERATIONS WITH AN INSTRUCTION THAT GENERAL 
DAMAGES MUST BE AWARDED. 
The jury found that Sergio Pruneda was injured in the July 31, 2002 collision and 
awarded him $4,762.07 in special damages. They awarded no general damages. R. 703. 
Counsel objected, and asked the court to send the jury out with an instruction that general 
damages must be awarded in a reasonable amount, and that nominal damages were not 
appropriate. R. 775 at 284-290. Plaintiffs also tendered a proposed instruction. R. 704. 
The court refused to give the instruction, and the jury was discharged over plaintiffs 
objection. R. 775 at 284-290. 
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When a jury awards special damages, a plaintiff is also entitled to an award of 
general damages. Langton v. International Transport, Inc., 491 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1971); 
Cohn v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 26 Utah 2d 452, 491 P.2d 1211 (1971). 
The trial court erred by overruling plaintiffs' objection to the failure to award 
general damages. In addition, the court erred by releasing the jury over plaintiffs' 
objection that they must award general damages. These errors were substantial and 
prejudicial and constitute reversible error. Tingey v. Christensen, 987 P.2d 588 (Utah 
1999). 
POINT II 
AN AWARD OF SPECIAL DAMAGES EXCEEDING $3.000.00 ENTITLES A 
PLAINTIFF TO A SUBSTANTIAL GENERAL DAMAGES AWARD, 
An award of special damages, in excess of Utah's statutory threshold of $3,000.00, 
should entitle a party to general damages in an amount which is substantial. Nominal 
damages are inappropriate in such a case. See, e.g., Kepley v. Kim, 843 P.2d 133 (Colo. 
App. 1992); Shewry v. Heuer, 121 N.W. 2d 529 (Iowa 1963). Nominal damages are 
appropriate only when a plaintiff fails to prove any damages. Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52 
(Utah 1998). Otherwise, the jury's failure to award general damages is "irreconcilably 
inconsistent and shows that the jury has disregarded proven elements of damage." 
Kumorek v. Moyers, 561 N.E. 2d 212, (111. App. 1990). 
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By exceeding the $3,000.00 statutory threshold, Sergio Pruneda suffered substantial 
special damages that should entitle him to more than nominal general damages. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l)(a)(v) (Supp. 2001). 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO ALLOW THE TREATING PHYSICIAN 
TO TESTIFY ABOUT THE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS' INJURIES, 
The bulk of the medical treatment the injuries the Prunedas received in the collision 
was provided by Dr. Gordon McClean. R. 780-86. Plaintiffs filed a designation under Rule 
26(a)(3)(A) which identified Dr. McClean as a doctor who would provide opinion 
evidence under Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence. R. 79-80. 
Defendants asked the court to exclude testimony by Dr. McClean about the cause of 
the injuries he treated because no expert witness report was filed pursuant to Rule 
26(a)(3)(B). R. 497-98. The court granted the motion. R. 773 at 38-55. 
The court limited Dr. McClean's trial testimony to his medical records and his 
treatment of the plaintiffs. Dr. McClean's records said he treated injuries that were 
received in the July 31, 2002 automobile accident. R. 773 at 96, 111, 127-28. Dr. 
McClean, without objection, read from his medical records for Donovan, Anthony and 
Cozy, that each of these children reached maximum medical improvement for injuries 
related to the July 31, 2002 collision on the date of their release from his care. Id. 
Following this testimony, Dr. McClean was asked to give his medical assessment of 
Matthew. Again, he read from his medical records. He said Matthew was released upon 
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reaching maximum medical improvement for injuries related to the July 31, 2002 collision. 
R. 773 at 133. 
Defendants objected to this testimony arguing it was a violation of the court's 
ruling on the Motion in Limine. R. 773 at 133-136. The court sustained the objection. 
In addition, the court instructed the jury to disregard all previous testimony of Dr. 
McClean on causation. R. 773 at 140-41. That instruction, and the failure of the court to 
allow the treating physician to testify from his medical records, caused the jury to disallow 
payment for all treatment rendered to the children by Dr. McClean. The jury awarded the 
children only $220.00 each in special damages, for treatment received at Total Health 
Institute. Exhibits 1-7. 
The Prunedas claim that the trial court erred as a matter of law in its interpretation 
of the requirements of Rule 26(a)(3). Rule 26(a)(3)(A) requires identification of witnesses 
who will render opinions under Rule 702. It does not require a specific expert report by a 
treating physician. Pete v. Youngblood, 141 P.3d 629 (Utah App. 2006). 
The plaintiffs were unfairly prejudiced when the court refused to let the treating 
physician read from his records, and then struck prior testimony which was received 
without objection. Plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial on the issue of damages. Id. 
The exclusion of the treating physician's opinions, coupled with the so-called 
curative instruction to disregard previously given testimony, denied the Prunedas a fair 
opportunity to establish the amount of special damages resulting from the July 31, 2002 
collision. The jury did not award special damages to any of the Pruneda children for 
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treatment by Dr. McClean. The refusal to award damages for Dr. McClean's treatment of 
the children was a direct result of the court's curative instruction and the ruling that Dr. 
McClean could not opine about the cause of the injuries he was treating. 
Such error was prejudicial and entitles the Prunedas to a new trial on the issue of 
damages. Tingey v. Christensen, supra. 
POINT IV 
THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF PAUL FRANCE WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE 
UNDER RULE 702 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, 
Defendants offered the testimony of Dr. Paul France as an expert on accident 
reconstruction. Plaintiffs asked the court to exclude the proposed testimony as lacking a 
proper foundation. R. 163-65; 774 at 112-13, 165-66, 190. The methodology used by Dr. 
France to determine the impact speed was unreliable, and had never been shown by any 
type of scientific testing to produce accurate results. Dr. France had admitted his 
conclusions were simply "educated guesses." See R. 774 at 142-47, 222-23. 
The court denied plaintiffs' motion. R. 463, 465. 
A hearing on the foundation for Dr. France's testimony was held at trial. R. 774 at 
113-166. The court ruled that Dr. France could testify about the impact speed of the 
defendant's Durango hitting the rear of the Pruneda LeBaron. R. 774 at 165-66. 
When an expert opinion is offered under Rule 702, the trial judge has a duty to 
ensure that the offered opinion is reliable. See Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1128 (Utah 
1980); State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989); Alder v. Bayer Corp., 61 P.3d 1068 
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(Utah 2002); State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996); Haupt v. Heaps, 131 P.3d 252 
(Utah App. 2005). Inherent reliability rather than general acceptance is the touchstone of 
admissibility. Id. The trial court has a responsibility to exclude so-called "junk science/' or 
"science" which has no accepted scientific basis. Id. 
The admissibility of expert evidence obtained using the same methodology 
employed by Dr. France was considered by the Virginia Supreme Court in Tittsworth v. 
Robinson, 252 Va. 151, 475 S.E.2d 261 (1996). The court said such testimony was 
unreliable as a matter of law. 475 S.E. 2d at 262-63. Like this case, the expert in 
Tittsworth never saw the cars involved in the crash. Like Dr. France, he did not have all of 
the damage information necessary to reconstruct the accident, and the Virginia court found 
that he must have used estimates to reach his conclusions. 
Dr. France admitted that he could not reconstruct an accident without repair 
estimates and photographs of the damage to all of the involved cars. Id. at 140:22-141:2. 
But then, he proceeded to reconstruct this accident (involving three cars) with no 
photographs or repair estimates for the Nova, and no knowledge of the total amount of 
damage to the LeBaron. 
His methodology was a combination of crush analysis and momentum equations. 
R. 774 at 119:13-17. He admitted that if he used the damage to the cars to determine the 
crush involved in the collision, he must know all of the damage that occurred. Id. at 
144:8-13. Yet he admitted he did not know all of the damage in this collision. Id. at 139-
142. He admitted there was damage to the Pruneda car that was not in the repair estimates. 
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R. 774 at 147:14-148:8. There was frame damage to the Pruneda vehicle of an unknown 
magnitude. Id. at 148:9-149:18. He did not even consider the significant damage to the 
rear of the Pruneda car a major part of his analysis. Id. at 137. 
Dr. France said his lack of information simply created a greater need to "estimate." 
Id. at 149-150. He admitted the more things you don't know, the more guesses you have 
to make. The more guesses you make, the greater the error. Id. at 223. All things 
considered, the so called expert opinion of Dr. France as to the impact speed in this 
collision is simply a mountain of guesswork. Id. at 145-47, 149-150, 222-23. 
While Dr. France may have a belief that his "estimates" are accurate and reliable, 
he admitted that there are no peer reviewed studies that show this methodology can 
produce an accurate replicable result. R. 774 at 226:12-19. There are no published 
studies of any kind that show his methodology produces accurate results. Id. at 226:20-
227:1. There have been no studies of this methodology that show the margin of error in 
the estimated impact speeds. Id. at 227:2-8. By his own admission, he could only give an 
educated guess about the impact speed. Id. at 145:4-147:7. 
An educated guess does not provide an adequate foundation for expert testimony. 
State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980)(expert may not give an opinion which 
represents a mere guess). Without evidence of the reliability of testing, the results of such 
tests are inadmissable. Koffordv. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343, 1346-47 (Utah 1987). 
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POINT V 
THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF JAYNE CLARKE WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE 
UNDER RULE 702 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, 
Defendants hired Dr. Jayne Clarke to review medical records and provide expert 
testimony at trial. Dr. Clarke, an M.D., reviewed medical records and documents provided 
by defendants and issued a report. R. 775 at 34-36. She never examined any of the 
plaintiffs. R. 775 at 90, 107:19-22. 
The Prunedas asked the court to exclude testimony of Dr. Clarke criticizing the 
treatment provided by Dr. McClean. R. 114-15. The motion was denied by the court. R. 
116-162, 349-439; R. 463-65. 
At trial, Dr. Clarke testified, over objection, that the Prunedas received too much 
chiropractic care; that there was minimal force involved in the collision; and that Dr. 
McClean's records were inadequate to support the treatment he had rendered. R. 775 at 
36-37, 47-65. 
Our Supreme Court has long held that practitioners in one specialty are not 
ordinarily competent to testify as experts on the standard of care applicable to practitioners 
in another specialty. Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993); Astill v. Clark, 
956 P.2d 1081 (Utah 1998); Chadwickv. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817 (Utah 1988); Dikeou v. 
Osborn, 881 P.2d 943 (Utah App. 1994); Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, 930 P.2d 904 
(Utah App. 1997). Testimony of medical experts is specific to their particular specialty. 
Id. A physician is not qualified to give an admissible opinion on the treatment provided by 
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another physician unless the physician giving the opinion is shown to have familiarity with 
the treating physician's particular area of practice. Butterfield v. Okubo, 790 P.2d 94 (Utah 
1990); Burton v. Youngblood, 111 P.2d 245 (Utah 1985); Dikeou v. Osborn, supra; Kent v. 
Pioneer Valley Hospital supra. 
Dr. Clarke admitted she has little or no training in chiropractic medicine. She is not 
a licensed chiropractor. R. 775 at 70-73. She admitted in her deposition to having little, if 
any, familiarity with the CAD treatment protocols adopted by the Utah Chiropractic 
Association. Then at trial, she claimed to have expertise on these treatment protocols. R. 
775 at 56-58, 82-83. She was allowed to testify extensively that the treatment rendered by 
Dr. McClean under the CAD Protocols was not appropriate. R. 775 at 58-65. 
The rationale for prohibiting an M.D. from scrutinizing an M.D. in a different 
specialty is even more compelling when an M.D. scrutinizes the care rendered by a 
chiropractor. Dr. Clarke does not practice the chiropractic method. She said chiropractic 
medicine uses a different theory of healing, that chiropractors treat differently than an 
M.D., and that the number of appropriate treatments is not standardized. R. 775 at 70-74. 
The admission of Dr. Clarke's testimony is governed by URE Rule 702. Dr. Clarke 
must show she has the background and training in chiropractic medicine that would allow 
her to opine on the type and amount of chiropractic care rendered by Dr. McClean in this 
case. Arnold v. Curtis, supra; Astill v. Clark, supra; Chadwick v. Nielsen, supra; 
Butterfield v. Okubo, supra; Burton v. Youngblood, supra; Martin v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337 
(Utah 1987). She did not. R. 775 at 69-74, 81-92. She failed to do so. 
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There was a total lack of any foundation for Dr. Clarke's opinions. She never saw 
or examined any of the Prunedas. Her testimony was based solely upon a review of 
medical records and other written materials provided by the defense. The court abused its 
discretion when it allowed her to give testimony regarding the chiropractic standard of 
care. Id. See State v. Pena, supra. 
IX 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO SEND THE JURY FOR 
FURTHER DELIBERATIONS WITH AN INSTRUCTION THAT GENERAL 
DAMAGES MUST BE AWARDED, 
The jury awarded Sergio Pruneda $4,762.07 in special damages and no general 
damages. Plaintiffs asked the Court to instruct the jury to award general damages in a 
reasonable amount. Plaintiffs also tendered a proposed instruction. R. 704. The jury was 
discharged over plaintiffs objection. R. 775 at 284:8-290:9. 
Whether or not the court should have given the post-judgment instruction is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1386 
(Utah 1995); Langton v. International Transport, Inc., supra; Cohn v. J. C. Penney Co., 
Inc., supra. 
If a jury awards special damages, general damages must be awarded. Langton v. 
International Transport, Inc., supra. When a jury awards special damages, but no general 
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damages, the court must instruct them on their error and allow them to deliberate further 
on an award of general damages. Id. 
The trial court erred by overruling plaintiffs' objection to the failure to award 
general damages. In addition, the court erred by releasing the jury over plaintiffs' 
objection that they must award general damages. These errors were substantial and 
prejudicial because Sergio was denied his right to recover general damages. 
POINT II 
AN AWARD OF SPECIAL DAMAGES EXCEEDING $3.000,00 ENTITLES A 
PLAINTIFF TO A SUBSTANTIAL GENERAL DAMAGES AWARD, 
An award of special damages, in excess of Utah's statutory threshold of $3,000.00, 
should entitle a party to a substantial award of general damages. Nominal damages cannot 
be awarded by a jury in such a case. See, e.g., Kepley v. Kim, 843 P.2d 133 (Colo. App. 
1992) (award of $0.00 in non-economic damages could not stand in the face of a special 
damage award of $3,000.00 incurred for treatment and alleviation of pain); Shewry v. 
Heuer, 121 N.W. 2d 529 (Iowa 1963) (abuse of discretion to not grant a new trial where 
jury awarded costs of medical expenses for treatment of pain and suffering yet nothing for 
general damages). 
By awarding $4,762.07 for medical treatment, the jury found that Sergio Pruneda 
suffered sufficiently serious pain and injury to warrant at least $3,000.00 in medical 
treatment for injuries resulting from the accident. 
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Nominal damages are appropriate only when a plaintiff fails to prove any damages. 
Foote v. Clark, supra. Therefore, when $4,762.07 is awarded for special damages, the 
jury's failure to award general damages is irreconcilably inconsistent and shows that the 
jury has disregarded proven elements of damage. See, Kumorek v. Moyers, supra. 
The amount of special damages necessary to allow a plaintiff to recover damages 
for pain and suffering has been statutorily determined to be $3,000.00. Utah's no-fault 
threshold statute, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309, prohibits a general damage award in 
smaller tort claims arising out of car accidents. However, even in those cases, special 
damages may be justified when a legal right has been invaded. See, Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-22-309 (l)(a); Warren v. Melville, 937 P.2d 556, 563 (Utah App. 1997). By 
exceeding the $3,000.00 statutory threshold, Sergio Pruneda suffered substantial medical 
damages that should entitle him to more than nominal general damages for pain and 
suffering. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l)(a)(v) (Supp. 2001). 
This issue appears to be one of first impression in Utah. However, in Langton v. 
International Transport, Inc., supra, the Utah Supreme Court, in dictum, said: "[I]t must 
be conceded that if plaintiff were entitled to an award of special damages, he was entitled 
to be compensated, under the evidence, for pain and suffering . . . " Id. at 1214. Indeed, 
such is the rule in many other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Kepley v. Kim, supra; Shewry v. 
Heuer, supra. 
The concept that meeting a statutory threshold must entitle one to recover general 
damages suggests that more than nominal general damages must be awarded where the 
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statutory threshold has been met. Reaching the threshold ipso facto shows a serious 
injury. It would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to disallow general damages or 
to allow only a nominal amount when the statutory threshold which defines "serious 
injury" is met. For this reason, the trial court should have given the proposed instruction, 
R. 704, and sent the jury out to deliberate further on a general damages award. Sergio 
Pruneda was denied a fair trial on the issue of general damages. The verdict should be 
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial on damages. Upon remand, this court 
should instruct the trial court that nominal damages are not appropriate in this case. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO ALLOW THE TREATING PHYSICIAN 
TO TESTIFY ABOUT THE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS' INJURIES. 
The bulk of the medical treatment for treatment of the injuries the Prunedas 
received in the collision was provided by Dr. Gordon McClean. R. 780-86. Plaintiffs filed 
a designation under Rule 26(a)(3)(A) identifying Dr. McClean as one who would provide 
opinion evidence at trial under Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence. R. 79-80. 
On the opening day of trial, defendants filed a Motion in Limine asking the trial 
court to exclude any testimony of plaintiffs" treating doctor, Dr. McClean, on the issue of 
causation of plaintiffs' injuries. R. 497-98. The gist of the motion was that plaintiffs did 
not identify Dr. McClean as an expert witness, and failed to file the expert witness report 
required by Rule 26(a)(3)(B). R. 499-502. 
28 
The motion was filed the morning of trial and argued to the court. R. 773 at 38-55. 
Plaintiffs claimed that their expert designation, R. 79-80, clearly informed defendants that 
Dr. McClean would be offering testimony at trial under Rule 702. In addition, because Dr. 
McClean would offer such opinions at trial under Rule 702, defendants had an opportunity 
and an obligation to inquire about such issues when they took his deposition on September 
21, 2004, and to review his records for opinions contained therein R. 773 at 40-49. 
Defendants argued to the court that they were prejudiced because they never 
received a Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert report. R. 499-502, 773 at 49-52. Plaintiffs claimed 
that no such report was required because Dr. McClean was not a "retained expert" as that 
term is used in Rule 26(a)(3)(B). Plaintiff directed the court to the advisory committee's 
notes to the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 773 at 42-47. 
See, Appendix Exhibit 6. 
The court granted the motion and ruled that Dr. McClean would be precluded from 
giving any testimony at trial about the causation of the plaintiffs' injuries. R. 773 at 38-55. 
The court limited his testimony to treatment of the plaintiffs, and the materials contained 
in his medical records5. See, R. 773 at 54-55. 
5The court made rulings at trial which precluded Dr. McClean from testifying 
regarding specific entries in the medical records which refer to the treatments of the 
children as being for injuries received in the automobile collision. (R. 773 at 53-55) The 
court required the medical records be redacted to remove such entries. (R. 773 at 144-46) 
The entries were redacted from the medical records admitted at trial. R. 780-786. 
Unredacted copies were introduced by Defendants as exhibits to the deposition of Dr. 
McClean taken on September 21, 2004. Copies of the pertinent unredacted records are 
contained in Exhibit 5 of the Appendix. 
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Dr. McClean's records made specific reference to his treatment of injuries received 
by plaintiffs in the July 31, 2002 automobile accident. Without objection, he read from his 
medical records for Donovan, Anthony and Cozy. He said each of these children reached 
maximum medical improvement for injuries related to the July 31, 2002 collision on the 
date of their release from his care. R. 773 at 96, 111, 127-28. Following this testimony, 
Dr. McClean was asked about his treatment of Matthew Pruneda. He was asked to give 
his medical assessment of Matthew upon release from treatment. Again, he read from his 
medical records that Matthew reached maximum medical improvement for injuries related 
to the July 31, 2002 collision. R. 773 at 132-33. 
Only then did defendants object to this testimony. R. 773 at 133:3-8. This 
objection was to the same question that was asked and answered without objection during 
testimony regarding Donovan, Anthony and Cozy. R. 773 at 96, 111, 127-28. Defendants 
objected to the testimony arguing it was a violation of the court's ruling on the Motion in 
Limine. R. 773 at 133-36. 
Plaintiffs argued that the statements were from medical records of Dr. McClean. R. 
773 at 136-140. These were records that defense counsel had since early 2004, and which 
were used as exhibits in the McClean deposition on September 21, 2004. Plaintiffs argued 
the court had never ruled that Dr. McClean could not testify about the content of his 
medical records, and that the failure to previously object was a waiver of any objection to 
his giving similar testimony from his records. R. 773 at 54-55, 144-47. 
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The court sustained the objection. In addition, the court instructed the jury to 
disregard all previous testimony of Dr. McClean on causation. R. 773 at 140-141. 
The instruction proposed by defendants and given by the court stated: 
Members of the jury, I instruct you that any testimony by Dr. McClean that 
his diagnosis was related or caused by the MVA - motor vehicle accident -
excuse me, motor vehicle accident of July 31, 02 is stricken and you should 
disregard that testimony and not consider it. 
R. 773 at 140:24-141:6. 
Plaintiffs believe that this instruction and the failure of the court to allow the treating 
physician to testify from his medical records caused the jury to disallow payment for all 
treatment rendered to the Pruneda children by Dr. McClean. The jury awarded the 
children only $220.00 each in special damages. That is the exact amount each child paid 
for treatment at Total Health Institute, prior to their treatment by Dr. McClean. 
The rulings by the trial court unfairly prejudiced plaintiffs and require granting of a 
new trial. Pete v. Youngblood, supra; Tingey v. Christensen, supra. Testimony by a 
treating doctor was disallowed. Moreover, the jury was told to disregard the prior 
testimony from his records that he treated the children for injuries received in the collision. 
The court effectively told the jury there was no evidence to connect Dr. McClean's 
treatment to the collision. 
The court erred in its interpretation of Rule 26(a)(3). There is no issue that 
plaintiffs' expert designation, R. 79-80, complied with the requirements of Rule 
26(a)(3)(A). The plain language of Rule 26(a)(3)(B) only requires a written report for a 
witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or 
31 
whose duties as a party's employee regularly involve the giving of expert testimony. A 
treating physician does not meet this definition. 
After entry of the Judgment in this case, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its 
opinion in the case of Pete v. Youngblood, supra. The Court said: 
Rule 26(a)(3) relates to the disclosure of expert testimony and creates two distinct 
requirements: (1) disclosure of the identity of experts and (2) provision of an expert 
report. 
Nothing in rule 26(a)(3)(A) limits the obligation to identify persons who may be 
used to give expert opinions. In contrast, rule 26(a)(3)(B) states: 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this 
disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially 
employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an 
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be 
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or party. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B). Thus, rule 26(a)(3) contemplates that all persons who 
may provide opinion testimony based on experience or training will be identified, 
but that only retained or specially employed experts are required to also provide an 
expert report. Indeed, the rule itself recognizes that only some of the experts that 
must be identified will also be required to file a report. 141 P.3d at 633 (emphasis 
added). 
Citing federal court authority, Utah's Court held that the requirement of Rule 26(a)(3)(B) 
that a report be given does not address itself to the expert whose information was not 
acquired in preparation for trial. Rather, because he was an actor or viewer with respect to 
transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit (a treating 
doctor) such an expert should be treated as an ordinary witness. Id. at 634. 
Defendants had the opportunity to depose Dr. McClean as to the treatment he 
rendered to the Pruneda family, as well as the statements in his medical records that the 
treatment was for injuries received in the collision. 
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Normally, a decision of a trial court to admit or exclude expert testimony is 
reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. E.g. Dikeou v. Osborn, supra. However, 
courts recognize that a ruling on evidence is often the sum of other rulings which are 
reviewable under separate standards of review. See State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, 900 
(Utah App. 1996). Because the trial court's rulings regarding the admissibility of the 
proposed testimony of Dr. McClean were made based in toto upon the trial court's 
erroneous interpretation of the requirements of Rule 26(a)(3), this court should review the 
ruling for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 
P.2d 1234, 1243 (Utah 1998) cert, denied 119 S. Ct. 1803 (1999). 
The person asserting error has the burden to show not only that the error occurred 
but also that it was substantial and prejudicial. Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 997 P.2d 
508, 511 (Utah App. 1999); Tingey v. Christensen, supra. The exclusion of the treating 
physician's opinions, coupled with the so-called curative instruction to disregard 
previously given testimony, denied the Prunedas a fair opportunity to establish the amount 
of special damages resulting from the July 31, 2002 collision. Plaintiffs were not given a 
meaningful opportunity to present evidence of Dr. McClean's charges. The jury did not 
award special damages to any of the Pruneda children for treatment by Dr. McClean. The 
refusal to award damages for Dr. McClean's treatment of the children was a direct result 
of the court's curative instruction coupled with the ruling that Dr. McClean could not 
opine about the cause of the injuries he was treating. 
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Such error is ipso facto prejudicial. It entitles the Prunedas to a new trial on the 
issue of damages. This case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to 
schedule a new trial for the Prunedas on the issue of damages, and to allow Dr. McClean 
to render his opinions regarding causation of the injuries. 
POINT IV 
THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF PAUL FRANCE WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE 
UNDER RULE 702 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, 
A. Background 
Defendants offered the testimony of Dr. Paul France as an expert on accident 
reconstruction. Plaintiffs asked the court to exclude the proposed testimony as lacking a 
proper foundation. R. 163-65; 774 at 112-13, 165-66, 190. The methodology used by Dr. 
France to determine the impact speed was unreliable, and had never been shown by any 
type of scientific testing to produce accurate results. Dr. France admitted his conclusions 
were simply "educated guesses." See R. 774 at 142-47, 222-23. 
The court denied plaintiffs' motion. R. 463, 465. In its ruling, the court stated that 
it would hold a hearing at trial on the foundation for his expert testimony. Id. 
A hearing on the foundation for Dr. France's testimony was held on April 19, 2006. 
R. 774 at 113-166. The court ruled that Dr. France could testify that the impact speed of 
the defendant's Durango hitting the rear of the Pruneda LeBaron was in the range of 9-12 
miles per hour. R. 774 at 128-133, 165-66. 
34 
B. Legal Standard, 
When an expert opinion is offered under Rule 702, the trial judge has a duty to 
ensure that the offered opinion is reliable. See Phillips v. Jackson, supra; State v. 
Rimmasch, supra; Alder v. Bayer Corp., supra; State v. Crosby, supra\ Haupt v. Heaps, 
supra.. Inherent reliability rather than general acceptance is the touchstone of 
admissibility. Id. The trial court has a responsibility to exclude so called "junk science," or 
"science" which has no accepted scientific basis. Id. 
In Kofford v. Flora, supra, our Supreme Court held that without evidence of the 
reliability of testing, the results of such tests are inadmissable. Id. at 1346-47. The 
Kofford Court held that if the techniques used in the testing are not shown to be accepted 
as reliable, the court must find the test to be unreliable. Id. at 1347. Since Dr. France 
admitted there have never been any tests which establish the reliability of his methods, the 
methods he used must be found to be unreliable as a matter of law. Id.; Tittsworth v. 
Robinson, supra. In addition his lack of necessary information about the cars makes his 
conclusions inadmissible. Kofford v. Flora, supra. 
Legitimate science consists of methodologies that have been shown by scientific 
testing to produce consistent and reliable results. Accepted scientific methodologies are 
subjected to testing to show that the methodology produces consistent and reliable results. 
Margins of error in the testing are measured and published. The testing is peer reviewed 
for accuracy and reliability. The methodology is reviewed to see if it consistently 
produces the same results, and to see if the results can be consistently replicated. 
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In its gatekeeper role, the trial court must ensure that any so-called "scientific 
evidence" is inherently reliable; that the scientific principles and techniques used by the 
expert, and found by the court to be reliable, have been properly applied to specific facts at 
issue in the case, and not to mere speculations or guesses; and that the "experts" are 
sufficiently qualified to correctly apply the techniques and principles. Id. See, Phillips v. 
Jackson, supra; State v. Rimmasch, supra; State v. Crosby, supra. 
When a party challenges the methodology used to reach the conclusions to which 
the expert expects to opine, it is not sufficient for the expert to bootstrap his opinions by 
merely stating "all accident ^constructionists use this method." The expert should be 
required to produce some tangible evidence that the methodology has been peer reviewed, 
that it produces reliable results, and that it is a method that can produce accurate and 
replicable results with a measurable margin of error. Phillips v. Jackson, supra (inherent 
reliability rather than general acceptance is the touchstone of admissibility). 
If "reliability" rather than claimed "general acceptance" is the touchstone of 
admissibility, then an expert should be required to demonstrate to the court that his 
methodology has been scientifically tested, and shown to produce reliable results. Dr. 
France was unable to identify a single study that showed his methodology had any degree 
of reliability. R. 774 at 226-27. He had nothing to corroborate his claim that the 
methodology is generally accepted or that it produces accurate and reliable results. Id. 
The admissibility of expert evidence derived from the same methodology used by 
Dr. France was considered by the Virginia Supreme Court in Tittsworth v. Robinson, 
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supra. The Court said such evidence was speculative, unreliable, and lacked foundation as 
a matter of law. 475 S.E.2d. at 262-63. The Court said: 
[W]e think the experts1 testimony here fails to meet the fundamental 
requirements enumerated above. With respect to Cipriani, there was no 
showing that the crash tests relied upon were conducted under conditions 
similar to those existing at the accident scene. More importantly, Cipriani 
never examined the vehicles involved in the collision; rather, he relied solely 
upon the photographs of the vehicles to determine the permanent crush 
damage thereto. He did not know whether the undercarriages of the vehicles 
had been damaged, and, if so, the extent thereof. Indeed, Cipriani simply 
"assumed" that each vehicle sustained a crush damage of one-half an inch. 
475 S.E. 2d at 263. 
Like this case, the expert in Tittsworth never saw the cars involved in the crash. Like Dr. 
France, he did not have all of the damage information. The court decided the expert must 
have used estimates to reach his conclusions. Such evidence lacked a sufficient 
foundation and was speculative. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
A defendant always has the burden to produce an adequate foundation for any 
proposed expert testimony. An adequate foundation requires not only that the 
methodology is reliable, but that the expert have sufficient information to apply the 
methodology. He cannot fill in the blanks with guesses. State v. Mead, 27 P.3d 1115 
(Utah App. 2001). 
An educated guess does not provide an adequate foundation for expert testimony. 
State v. Jarrell, supra (expert may not give an opinion which represents a mere guess). 
Without evidence of the reliability of testing, the results of such tests are inadmissable. 
Koffordv. Flora, supra at 1346-47. 
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Due to the speculation involved in Dr. France's determination of impact speed, his 
testimony was inherently unreliable and the court should not have allowed him to testify as 
to his opinions on the impact speed of the Gray car. Id. 
This type of speculative testimony is not admissible. State v. Rimmasch, supra; 
Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 31 P.3d 557 (Utah 2001); See State v. 
Pendergrass, 803 P.2d 261 (Utah app. 1990)(psychiatrist's testimony excluded because it 
relied upon too many unknown facts); Ostler v. Aldina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445 
(Utah app 1989)(expert opinion excluded because based, in part, on speculation as to facts). 
C. There was no proper foundation for the testimony of Dr. France because his 
methodology was flawed and there was insufficient factual information to allow him 
to use the methodology. 
In this case, not only was the methodology employed by Dr. France unreliable, but 
Dr. France admitted he did not have sufficient information to apply his methodology. 
Because he lacked the necessary information about all three cars he had to guess to reach 
his conclusions. Such guessing is not a proper foundation for an opinion. State v. Jarrell, 
supra. 
1. The methodology employed by Dr. France has never been shown to be 
reliable. 
Dr. France's methodology is unreliable as a matter of law, because no peer review 
study has shown it will produce accurate results. R. 774 at 226:12-19. There are no 
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published studies of any kind that show his methodology produces accurate results. Id. at 
226:20-227:1. There have been no studies of this methodology that show the margin of 
error in the estimated impact speeds. Id. at 227:2-8. By his own admission, he could only 
give an educated guess about the impact speed. Id. at 145-47. 
The methodology employed by Dr. France is exactly the type of "junk science" 
which the courts have stated must not be allowed in the courtroom. Because it depends on 
the "educated guesswork" of the person doing the testing, it cannot be replicated. There is 
no known margin of error. There is no way to test its accuracy. It is simply a method that 
was developed to allow a purported expert to guess at the impact speed under a veneer of 
respectability. The methodology is used by Dr. France only in litigation and has no other 
purpose. R. 774 at 163:7-16, 231. 
Although Dr. France claimed his methodology is commonly used, and is published 
in SAE literature, he was unable to produce a single study showing testing and acceptance 
that his method has any degree of reliability. R. 774 at 226-27. 
2. Dr. France had insufficient information to properly apply his methodology. 
Even if the methodology was reliable, Dr. France lacked the information he claimed 
was needed for his calculations. He didn't have information about the damages to all of the 
cars involved in the collision. R. 774 at 139-144. He admitted that his "opinion" is merely 
an educated guess. R. 774 at 145-47, 222-23. He cannot be allowed to render his "guess" 
as an expert opinion. State v. Jarrell, supra. 
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Dr. France said his methodology was a combination of crush analysis and 
momentum equations. R. 774 at 119:13-17. He admitted that if he used the damage to the 
cars to determine the crush involved in the collision, he must know all of the damage that 
occurred. Id. at 144:8-13. Yet he admitted he did not know all of the damage. Id. at 139-
142. He admitted there was damage to the Pruneda car that was not in the repair estimates. 
R. 774 at 147:14-148:8. There was frame damage to the Pruneda car of an unknown 
magnitude. Id. at 148:9-149:18. He did not even consider the significant damage to the rear 
of the Pruneda car a major part of his analysis. Id. at 137. 
To accomplish his analysis, Dr. France typically looks at photographs, repair 
estimates or invoices, and testimony to determine the damage to the cars. He then uses his 
conclusions about the amount of damage to make his opinions. Id. at 118-19. Dr. France 
claimed, with no supporting evidence, that this type of analysis is commonly used by 
accident reconstructionists. Prunedas objected to this testimony. Id. at 119-120, 125. Dr. 
France claims that the scientific basis for his analysis relies upon the laws of momentum. 
M a t 120-21. 
Dr. France testified that physics calculations allow one to determine the Delta V if 
the impact speed is known, or vice-versa. If neither is known, the momentum calculation 
cannot be done. Id. at 144:10-22, 222:2-16. 
In this case neither was known. Therefore, to get the gravity forces necessary to 
support Dr. Clarke's testimony, Dr. France made an educated guess, which he testified was 
the range offerees generated in the collision. R. 774 at 139-150, 222-23. Dr. France 
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admitted using his methodology to arrive at either the Delta V or impact speed so that he 
can do his calculations. R. 774 at 144:23-145:3. By his own admission, he could only give 
an "educated guess" about the impact speed. Id. at 145:4-147:7. 
Dr. France claims he uses barrier test data to help extrapolate impact speeds in a 
three car collision. Yet he admits he did not use data with respect to the rear damage on the 
LeBaron. Moreover, he had no data for the Nova. R. 774 at 139-150. 
The LeBaron had damage above the threshold in both front and rear. R. 774 at 137-
140. Dr. France claimed he could support the low numbers because of the minimal damage 
to the front of the Durango. Id. at 142. He paid little, if any, attention to the major damage 
to the rear of the Pruneda car. R. 774 at 137:15-16. Dr. France admitted the Durango 
caused significant damage to the rear of the LeBaron as shown in Exhibits 9 and 10. He 
admitted that the force of the collision drove the LeBaron forward with enough force to 
strike the Nova and cause damage similar to the damage to the rear of the LeBaron. He 
admitted there was damage above the threshold to the front of the LeBaron. There was still 
enough energy to push the Nova across the intersection. Dr. France claimed all of this 
*esulted from a blow to the rear of the LeBaron which he claimed occurred at under 12 
niles per hour. Id. at 133, 137-142, 151-52. 
Even if Dr. France could accurately determine the impact speed in a rear end 
collision solely from photographs, damage estimates, and barrier test data, he could not do 
;o in this case. By his own admission, he did not have the information he said is necessary 
o determine the crush. Id. at 147:8-13. He had no reliable information regarding damage 
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to the Nova. Id. at 216-17. He had no estimates or photographs of the damage to the 
Nova. He did not even know the full extent of the damage to the LeBaron. Id. at 128-29, 
142-43, 147-49. Dr. France readily admitted he did not have the information necessary to 
determine the amount of energy transferred between the cars in the crash. Id. at 143:16-25. 
Not having the information he claimed was necessary to do a reconstruction precluded him 
from making a reliable determination as to the impact speed. Dr. France claimed the laws 
of physics regarding conservation of momentum allow him to do his calculations. He 
testified it is a simple momentum equation. R. 774 at 118-121. The energy generated by 
the speed of the Durango at collision, must equal the energy expended to damage the 
Pruneda LeBaron, drive it into the Nova, damage the Nova, and drive the Nova across the 
intersection. Id. at 115, 118, 120-21. 
Dr. France admitted at trial that he had never visited the scene of the accident and 
had no idea as to the size of the intersection, nor the angle of incline of the roadway at the 
point of impact. The inherent unreliability of Dr. France's opinions as to impact speed are 
even greater in this case than in Tittsworth because in this case three cars were involved 
and there was no information about the damage to the third car. 
Dr. France said his lack of information simply created a greater need to "estimate." 
Id. at 149-150. He admitted the more things you don't know, the more guesses you have to 
make. The more guesses you make, the greater the error. Id. at 223. All things considered, 
the so called expert opinion of Dr. France as to the impact speed in this collision is simply a 
mountain of guesswork. Id. at 145-47, 149-150, 222-23. 
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D. Conclusion 
Many years ago, our Supreme Court stated: 
In view of the importance of the function entrusted to the expert witness, it is 
of great importance that the court carefully scrutinize his qualifications to 
guard against being led astray by the pseudo learned or charlatan who may 
purvey erroneous or too positive opinions without sound foundation. 
Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1959). 
This advice remains sound today. The true test of admissibility of an expert opinion 
should be its reliability. It is impermissible to allow a witness to "guess." 
Dr. France's testimony should not have been allowed. He simply guessed to provide 
necessary information to reach his conclusions. Such testimony is unreliable as a matter of 
law. Tittsworth v. Robinson, supra; Kofford v. Flora, supra; State v. Rimmasch, supra. The 
expert in Tittsworth lacked data and had to make guesses. 475 S.E. 2d at 262-63. So did Dr. 
France in this case. The expert in Tittsworth never saw the cars involved in the crash. Like 
Dr. France, he did not have all of the damage information and used estimates to reach his 
conclusions. Tittsworth held that such evidence lacked a sufficient foundation and was 
speculative. Id. This court should make the same finding. 
POINT V 
THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF JAYNE CLARKE WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE 
UNDER RULE 702 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, 
43 
Prior to trial, the Prunedas filed a Motion in Limine seeking to exclude testimony of 
Dr. Clarke regarding the treatment received by the Prunedas from Dr. McClean. R. 114-15. 
The motion was briefed. R. 116-162, 349-439. The motion was argued and denied by the 
court. R. 463-65. 
Dr. Clarke performed her medical examination using only medical records and 
documents provided by defendants. R. 775 at 34-36. She never examined any of the 
plaintiffs. R. 775 at 90, 107:19-22. At trial, Dr. Clarke testified that the Prunedas received 
too much chiropractic care. R. 775 at 51-65. The testimony of Dr. Clarke was received over 
numerous foundational objections by the Prunedas. R. 775 at 36, 37, 47, 57. Over 
objection, Dr. Clarke was allowed to testify, based on the report of Paul France, that the 
forces generated in the collision were minimal and compared to daily life activities. R. 775 
at 36-37. Over objection, she was allowed to criticize Dr. McClean's medical records and 
treatment. R. 775 at 47-65. 
Our Supreme Court has long held that practitioners in one medical specialty are not 
ordinarily competent to testify as experts on the standard of care applicable to practitioners 
in another specialty. Arnold v. Curtis, supra; Astill v. Clark, supra; Chadwick v. Nielsen, 
supra; Dikeou v. Osborn, supra; Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, supra. The testimony of 
medical experts is specific to their particular specialty. A physician is not qualified to give 
an admissible opinion on the treatment provided by another physician unless the physician 
giving the opinion is shown to have familiarity with the treating physician's particular area 
of practice. Butterfield v. Okubo, supra; Burton v. Youngblood, supra; Dikeou v. Osborn, 
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supra; Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hospital supra. Dr. Clarke had no such expertise regarding 
the practice of chiropractic medicine. In Martin v. Mott, supra, the Court held that the 
party offering a witness as an expert has a burden to establish the witness' knowledge and 
familiarity with the standard of care and treatment commonly practiced by physicians 
engaged in the other specialty. 
While it is true that the trial court has broad discretion over the admission of expert 
testimony, the trial court's determination regarding the admissibility of expert testimony is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Dikeou v. Osborn, supra; Pack v. Case, 30 
P.3d 436, (Utah App. 2001). 
Dr. Clarke admitted she has little or no training in chiropractic medicine. She is not a 
licensed chiropractor. R. 775 at 70-73. She admitted in her deposition to having little, if 
any, familiarity with the CAD treatment protocols adopted by the Utah Chiropractic 
Association. R. 775 at 82-83. Then at trial, she claimed to have expertise on these 
treatment protocols. R. 775 at 56-58. She was allowed to testify extensively that the 
treatment rendered by Dr. McClean was not appropriate and did not comply with CAD 
Protocols. R. 775 at 58-65. 
The rationale for prohibiting an M.D. from scrutinizing treatment by an M.D. in a 
different specialty is more compelling when an M.D. seeks to scrutinize the care rendered 
by a chiropractor. There is nothing in the record from which one could infer that Dr. 
Clarke is trained in, or familiar with, the standard followed by chiropractors or their 
application of the treatment protocols adopted by their medical association. In fact, Dr. 
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Clarke testified she does not practice using the chiropractic method, that chiropractic 
medicine uses a different theory of healing, that chiropractors treat their patients differently 
than would an M.D., and that the number of appropriate treatments is not standardized. R. 
775 at 70-74. Dr. Clarke testified that she became familiar with the CAD Protocols after 
her deposition and before trial. However, there was nothing in her testimony to indicate 
that she has the necessary knowledge or experience to give expert testimony on how a 
licensed chiropractor should apply the CAD Protocols in the treatment of patients. R. 775 at 
81-84. Notwithstanding her limited knowledge of the CAD Protocols, she offered 
numerous opinions about Dr. McClean's treatment. She claimed an ability to expertly 
interpret the standards set out in the CAD Protocols and apply them to Dr. McClean's 
records. R. 775 at 57-58, 84-114, 124-131. 
There was a total lack of any foundation for Dr. Clarke's opinions. Dr. Clarke never 
saw or examined any of the Prunedas. Her testimony was based solely upon a review of 
medical records and other written materials provided by the defense. 
The admission of Dr. Clarke's testimony is governed by Rule 702. Defendants must 
show that Dr. Clarke has the background, training and experience in chiropractic medicine 
that would allow her to opine on the type and amount of chiropractic care rendered by Dr. 
McClean in this case. Arnold v. Curtis, supra; Astill v. Clark, supra; Chadwick v. Nielsen, 
supra; Butterfield v. Okubo, supra; Burton v. Youngblood, supra; Martin v. Mott, supra. 
She did not. R. 775 at 69-74, 81-92. 
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This type of speculative testimony is not admissible. State v. Rimrnasch, supra; 
State v. Mead, supra; Brewer, supra. See State v. Pendergrass, supra (psychiatrist's 
testimony excluded because it relied upon too many unknown facts); Ostler v. Aldina 
Transfer Co., Inc., supra. 
Dr. Clarke's opinions are unreliable because she based her opinions, in part, upon 
her evaluation of the truth or falsity of witness' statements. This is something scientific 
experts are specifically forbidden to do. In Rimrnasch, supra, the court specifically held 
that an expert opinion, based in part on a determination that a certain witness is (or is not) 
telling the truth, is not admissible. 775 P.2d at 405-07. 
Dr. Clarke relied upon a statement from the deposition of Anthony Guererro, which 
she claims contradicted the testimony of Dr. McClean and his medical records. Therefore, 
she concluded, Dr. McClean's medical records could not be believed. See R. 775 at 38-39, 
58-62,92-101, 125-27,130-31. 
She relied upon a statement of the mother, who works all day, that she didn't see the 
children exercising. Therefore, she concluded the children did not do their exercises and 
Dr. McClean was wrong to say the children exercised under supervision at the McClean 
Clinic and had reported to the doctor that they were doing their exercises. R. 775 at 125-
27. 
A close review of the testimony shows that Dr. Clarke has no real training in 
chiropractic treatment methods and theories of treatment. R. 70-72. Her limited familiarity 
with the CAD Protocols consisted solely of review of some summaries between the date of 
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her deposition and the trial. This is an insufficient foundation to allow her to testify that 
Dr. McClean's treatment was excessive and unnecessary. Arnold v. Curtis, supra: As till v. 
Clark, supra; Chadwick v. Nielsen, supra; Dikeou v. Osborn, supra; Kent v. Pioneer Valley 
Hospital, supra. 
In the Dikeou case, the Court dealt with the issue of whether an emergency room 
physician could testify regarding the treatment rendered by a cardiologist. In holding that 
the emergency room doctor had an insufficient foundation to testify regarding care given by 
the cardiologist, the Court stated: 
It is true that, ordinarily, a practitioner of one school of medicine is not 
competent to testify as an expert in a malpractice action against a practitioner 
of another school. In light of the wide variation between schools in both 
precepts and practices, as a general matter this rule makes good sense. It has 
been judicially adopted in a majority of states, and we follow it here. 
In a later case, the supreme court, while noting the general rule that 
"practitioners in one specialty are not ordinarily competent to testify as 
experts on the standard of care applicable in another specialty," clarified the 
exception to the general rule stated earlier in Youngblood : 
An exception is made when a witness is knowledgeable about the standard of 
care of another specialty or when the standards of different specialties on the 
issue in a particular case are the same. Thus, according to Youngblood and 
Arnold, a medical expert witness brought in to testify on the applicable 
standard of care, and whose specialty differs from that of the allegedly 
negligent doctor, must show that he or she is knowledgeable about the 
applicable standard of care or that the standard of care in the expert's 
specialty is the same as the standard of care in the alleged negligent doctor's 
specialty. 881 P.2d at 947. (citations omitted)(emphasis added) 
After establishing this criteria for a physician in one specialty to testify regarding care and 
treatment given by a doctor in another specialty, the Court stated how the trial court's 
discretion should be exercised: 
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In exercising that discretion, we believe a trial court should require a medical 
expert witness to demonstrate familiarity with the applicable standard of care 
based on more than just a review of the documents in the particular case. By 
definition, an expert is one who possesses a significant depth and breadth of 
knowledge on a given subject. To allow a doctor in one specialty, retained as 
an expert witness, to become an "expert" on the standard of care in a different 
medical specialty by merely reading and studying the documents in a given 
case invites confusion, error, and a trial fraught with unreliable testimony. Id. 
at 947 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
The court then explained that before an expert can testify in a case, he must establish that 
he was knowledgeable in the field in which he proposes to give testimony before being 
retained as an expert witness. Id. See Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, supra. 
Dr. Clarke was similarly unable to establish such a background. She had no basis to 
critique Dr. McClean's treatment of the Prunedas. Her unfamiliarity with chiropractic 
medicine and its theories of healing, methods and treatment, and other standards precluded 
her from giving testimony about the care rendered by Dr. McClean. Her admission that her 
familiarity with the CAD treatment protocols came from a review of a summary of the 
CAD Protocols between her deposition and trial (R. 775 at 82-84) shows precisely the lack 
of foundation which the Dikeou and Kent courts held precluded the proposed expert from 
rendering an opinion. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial judge has a critical "gatekeeping" 
responsibility, when expert opinions are proffered, to "ensure that offered opinions are not 
only relevant, but reliable." State v. Crosby, supra; State v. Rimmasch, supra. This role is 
critical because juries have a tendency to abandon their responsibility to decide the facts 
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and simply adopt the judgment of an expert despite their inability to accurately appraise the 
validity of reasons underlying the opinion. State v. Rimmasch, supra. 
The trial court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Clarke to give testimony 
criticizing the treatment given by Dr. McClean. Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hospital supra; 
Dikeou v. Osborn, supra. The testimony of Dr. Clarke on the issues of the reasonableness 
and necessity of the care given by Dr. McClean; on the issues relating to the seriousness of 
the injuries suffered by the Prunedas; on the CAD Protocols and their application to the 
treatment of the Prunedas; and on the adequacy of the records kept by Dr. McClean; lacked 
the foundation required by law. Id. See State v. Crosby, supra; State v. Rimmasch, supra; 
Astill v. Clark, supra; Chadwick v. Nielsen, supra; Butterfield v. Okubo, supra; Dikeou v. 
Osborn, supra; Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
Premises considered, this Court should reverse the verdict of the jury on general and 
special damages and remand this matter back to the trial court with instructions to grant 
plaintiffs' Motions in Limine regarding the testimony of Dr. France and Dr. Clarke, and to 
deny the Motion in Limine of defendants regarding expert testimony of Dr. McClean, and 
with instructions to grant a new trial on damage issues only, with instruction to the jury that 
if it awards special damages of $3,000.00 or more, general damages, in more than a 
nominal amount must be awarded. 
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Mel S. Martin, P.C. 
Edward T. Wells 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-22-309 (Supp. 2001) 
CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES §31A-22-309 
2. Persons covered generally 
Whether employee is entitled to personal inju-
ry protection (PIP) benefits cannot turn on em-
ployer's decision to secure private insurance or 
to self-insure. U.C.A.1953, 41-12a-407(2). 
Neel v. State, 1995, 889 P.2d 922. Insurance 
<3=>2660 
3. Family and household members 
Father of deceased passenger was not entitled 
to personal injury protection coverage under the 
driver's policy where passenger was not a rela-
tive of the driver's family who resided with 
them nor was he killed while riding in a vehicle 
which was insured by driver's insurer. U.C.A. 
1953, 31A-22-308. McCaffery for and on Be-
half of McCaffery v. Grow, 1990, 787 P.2d 901. 
Insurance <S=» 2661 
4. Governmental vehicles 
Although state's self-insurance program ex-
cludes personal injury protection (PIP) benefits 
to any person entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits, this exclusion is not in harmony with 
statutory requirements and is, therefore, invalid. 
U.C.A.1953, 31A-22-309(3)(a). Neel v. State, 
1995, 889 P.2d 922. Insurance <3=> 2847 
Action brought against state by passenger in-
jured in state-owned vehicle to recover personal 
injury protection benefits was contractual in 
nature, making procedural requirements of 
Governmental Immunity Act inapplicable. 
U.C.A.1953, 31A-l-301(48)(a), 31A-22-302, 
31A-22-307, 31 A-22-308(3), 31 A-22-309(5), 
41-12a-103(9), 41-12a-301(3), 41-12a-406(2), 
41-12a-407(l), 63-30-5(1), 63-30-19. Neel v. 
State, 1993, 854 P.2d 581. States <®=> 197 
5. Workers' compensation benefits 
Where automobile accident is covered by both 
workers' compensation and no-fault insurance, 
statute providing that personal injury protection 
(PIP) benefits are payable to injured employee 
but are reduced by benefits which he receives 
under workers' compensation permits no-fault 
insurer to exclude some liability, that which is 
compensable under workers' compensation, but 
not all liability; overruling IML Freight, Inc. v. 
Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296. U.C.A.1953, 
31A-22-309(3)(a). Neel v. State, 1995, 889 
P.2d 922. Insurance <S=> 2847 
No-fault insurers, including self-insurers, are 
required to pay personal injury protection (PIP) 
benefits to injured employees to extent that 
those benefits exceed workers ' compensation 
benefits. Neel v. State, 1995, 889 P.2d 922. 
Insurance <®=» 2847 
6. Costs and attorney fees 
Insurer of pedestrian who was struck and 
injured by tractor-trailer was not entitled to 
award of prejudgment interest and attorney fees 
in its breach of contract action against insurer 
for trucking company that owned tractor-trailer, 
after trucking company's insurer refused to re-
imburse pedestrian's insurer for personal injury 
protection (PIP) benefits; pedestrian, as person 
entitled to benefits, never submitted claim for 
PIP benefits to trucking company's insurer, and 
even if pedestrian had submitted claim for bene-
fits, it would have been her personal remedy to 
pursue action for prejudgment interest and at-
torney fees, not her insurer's remedy. U.C.A. 
1953, 31A-22-308, 31A-22-309(5). Regal Ins. 
Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 2002, 42 P.3d 387, 440 
Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 2002 UT App 27, certiorari 
granted 48 P.3d 979, affirmed 93 P.3d 99, 494 
Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 2004 UT 19. Insurance &* 
3585; In teres t«» 39(2.35) 
§ 31A-22-309 . Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal injury 
protection 
(l)(a) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under 
a policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of 
action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been 
caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained one 
or more of the following: 
(i) death; 
(ii) dismemberment; 
(iii) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective 
findings; 
(iv) permanent disfigurement; or 
(v) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
(b) Subsection (l)(a) does not apply to a person making an uninsured 
motorist claim. 
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(2)(a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this part 
may only exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another 
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured or a 
resident family member of the insured and not insured under the policy, 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the insured 
motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the insured or 
while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his 
injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony; 
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of any 
motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition incident to 
any of the foregoing; or 
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or 
other hazardous properties of nuclear materials. 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which may 
be contained in other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are 
reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a 
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation 
or similar statutory plan; and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive from 
the United States or any of its agencies because that person is on active duty 
in the military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, 
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by 
the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
(5)(a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be 
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. 
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 days 
after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses 
incurred during the period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the 
entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid 
within 30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any part or all oi 
the remainder of the claim that is later supported by reasonable proof is also 
overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof is received by the insurer. 
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall 
bear interest at the rate of \-lk% per month after the due date. 
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(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract to 
recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is required 
by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the insurer is also 
required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to 
the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally 
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another insurer, 
including the Workers' Compensation Fund created under Chapter 33, the 
insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the 
other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount shall be 
decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
Laws 1985, c. 242, § 27; Laws 1986, c. 204, § 160; Laws 1988, 2nd Sp. Sess., c. 10, 
§ 10; Laws 1991, c. 74, § 8; Laws 1992, c. 230, § 9; Laws 1994, c. 4, § 1; Laws 2000, 
c. 222, § 5, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2001, c. 59, § 3, eff. April 30, 2001. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Complementary Legislation: Md.—Code, Insurance, §§ 19-501 to 19-516. 
Ark.—A.C.A. §§ 23-89-201 to 23-89-214. Mass.—M.G.L.A. c. 90, §§ 34A, 34D, 34M, 
Colo.—West's C.R.S.A. §§10-4-701 to 34N, 340; c. 175, § 113B. 
10-4-723. Mich.—M.C.L.A. §§ 500.3101 to 500.3179. 
Conn.—C.G.S.A. § 38a-363 et seq. Minn.—M.S.A. §§ 65B.41 to 65B.71. 
DC—D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed. N.J.—N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 et seq. 
§§ 31-2401 to 31-2413. N.Y.—McKinney's Insurance Law, §§ 5101 to 
Fla.—West's F.S.A. §§ 627.730 to 627.7405. 5108. 
Ga.—O.C.G.A. §§ 33-34-1 to 33-34-8. N.D.—NDCC 26.1-41-01 to 26.1-41-20. 
Hawaii—H R S §§ 43L10C-101 to Ore.—ORS 742.520 to 742.544. 
43L10C-121. Pa.—75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1791 to 1799.7. 
Kan.—K.S.A. 40-3101 to 40-3121. S.C.—Code 1976, § 38-77-10 et seq. 
Ky.—KRS 304.39-010 to 304.39-350. Utah—U.C.A. 1953, 31A-22-309. 
Cross References 
No-fault tort immunity ineffective, see § 41-12a-304. 
Uniform Arbitration Act, see § 78-31a-101 et seq. 
Law Review and Journal Commentaries 
Barrus, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie: Reim-
bursement Between Insurers Under Utah's No-
Fault Act, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 379 (1981). 
Research References 
AI-R Library Commercial and General Business Activi-
33 A.L.R.5th 303, Intoxication of Automobile ,,tifs; ^ „ i
 n£~, Tin_ ^ . o £* • 
n . o • V A A- r> •*• r> 33 A.L.R.4th 767, What Constitutes Sufficient-
Driver as Basis for Awarding Punitive Dam-
 }y S e r i o u s p e r s o n a l I n j m y D i s a b i l i t V ; Im_ 
^- fes' pairment, or the Like to Justify Recovery of 
^ A.L.R.5th 241, Excessiveness or Inadequa- Damages Outside of No-Fault Automobile 
cy of Attorney's Fees in Matters Involving Insurance Coverage. 
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SUPREME COURT § 78-2-2 
otherwise unable to serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice. 
The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate chief justice as 
consistent with law. 
Laws 1951, c. 58, § 1; Laws 1969, c. 247, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 47, § 40; Laws 1988, c. 
248, § 4; Laws 1990, c. 80, § 4. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp., § 104-2-1. 
Cross References 
Judges Contributory Retirement Act, see § 49-17-101 et seq. 
Judges Noncontributory Retirement Act, see § 49-18-101 et seq. 
Supreme court, generally, see Const. Art. 8, § 2. 
Supreme court jurisdiction, see Const. Art. 8, § 3. 
Library References 
Courts <S*48. C.J.S. Courts § 4. 
Judges <s*3, 1. C.J.S. Judges §§ 2 to 7, 12 to 13. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 106k48; 
227k3; 227kl. 
§ 78 -2 -1 .5 . Repealed by Laws 1971, c. 182, § 4 
§ 78 -2 -1 .6 . Repealed by Laws 1981, c. 267, § 2, eff. July 1, 1982 
§ 7 8 - 2 - 2 . Supreme Court jurisdiction 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state 
law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to 
final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating 
with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources re-
viewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
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(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudi-
cative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitu-
tion of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first 
degree felony or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling 
on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of z 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petitior 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but th* 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63. 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
Laws 1986, c. 47, § 41; Laws 1987, c. 161, § 303; Laws 1988, c. 248, § 5; Laws 1989 
c. 67, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 127, § 11; Laws 1994, c. 191, § 2; Laws 1995, c. 267, § 5, eff 
May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 299, § 46, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 159, § 18, eff 
July 1, 1996; Laws 2001, c. 302, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001. 
Cross References 
Extraordinary writs, judicial code, see § 78-35-1 et seq. 
Mandamus and prohibition, see § 78-35-9. 
Supreme court jurisdiction over extraordinary writs, see § 78-2-2. 
Supreme court jurisdiction, see § 78-2-2. 
Library References 
Administrative Law and Procedure ^>651 to Westlaw Key Number Searches: 106k248 
686, 721 to 726. 106k206(17.4); 106k207; 106k485; 73k9 
Certiorari <3=>9. 15Ak651 to 15Ak686; 15Ak721 to 15Ak726 
Courts <3=>248, 206(17.4), 207, 485. C.J.S. Certiorari §§ 7 to 8. 
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Rule 25 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Note 9 
Suggestion of death of party to lawsuit, filing 
of which will begin 90-day period during which 
motion for substitution must be filed in order to 
avoid dismissal, need not be served on unidenti-
fied nonparties. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 25(a)(1). 
Stoddard v. Smith, 2001, 27 P.3d 546, 423 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 10, 2001 UT 47. Parties <3=> 60 
Plaintiff, who had 53 days to file for letters of 
administration after time allowed for deceased 
defendant's relatives to petition for such letters 
had expired but who made no request for pro-
bate of estate and did not ask for enlargement of 
90-day period for moving for substitution of 
parties, was not in position to complain of any 
conflict between rule, which provides that ac-
tion shall be dismissed as to deceased party 
unless motion for substitution is made within 90 
days, and Probate Code provision giving next of 
kin three months to apply for letters of adminis-
tration before others may apply. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rules 6(b), 25(a); U.C.A.1953, 
75-4-1, 75-4-3. Connelly v. Rathjen, 1976, 547 
P.2d 1336. Abatement And Revival <®=> 74(1) 
10. Dismissal 
Failure of automobile accident victim who 
brought personal injury action against two oth-
ers related to accident, to file motion to substi-
tute defendants within 90 days after date on 
which attorney who had represented one defen-
dant filed suggestion of death was sufficient 
basis to dismiss complaint with prejudice. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 25. Donahue v. Smith, 
2001, 27 P.3d 552, 423 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 2001 
UT46. Pretrial Procedure <$=> 556.1 
Dismissal of personal injury action for failure 
to timely substitute proper party after attorney 
who had represented defendant filed suggestion 
of death was presumed to be with prejudice, 
even though Rule of Civil Procedure provided 
that dismissal for lack of indispensable party 
would be considered dismissal without preju-
dice, where provision referred only to dismissal 
under Rule allowing dismissal of action when 
necessary party was not joined, dismissal for 
lack of substitution was governed by separate 
Rule allowing dismissal with prejudice, and 
judgment did not indicate that dismissal was 
without prejudice. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 
19(b), 25, 41(b). Donahue v. Smith, 2001, 27 
P.3d 552, 423 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 2001 UT 46. 
Pretrial Procedure <§=> 690 
Under Rule of Civil Procedure governing dis-
missal of actions, district court was not required 
to dismiss personal injury complaint With preju-
dice for failure to timely substitute defendant 
after attorney who had represent defendant filed 
suggestion of death, given that Rule provided 
only that, unless court in dismissal order pro-
vided otherwise, dismissal operated as adjudica-
tion upon merits. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 25, 
41(b). Donahue v. Smith, 2001, 27 P.3d 552, 
423 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 2001 UT 46. Pretrial 
Procedure <£=> 690 
11. Review 
Absent an abuse of discretion, reviewing court 
will affirm district court order denying motion 
to extend the time for filing motion for substitu-
tion of party. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 6, 25. 
Stoddard v. Smith; 2001, 27 P.3d 546, 423 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 10, 2001 UT 47. Appeal And Error 
<®»949 
Whether district court properly dismissed 
complaint based on plaintiff's failure to make a 
motion for substitution within 90 days after 
defendant's law firm filed a suggestion of death 
following death of defendant during pendency 
of litigation presented a question of law subject 
to review for correctness. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
25. Stoddard v. Smith, 2001, 27 P.3d 546, 423 
Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2001 UT 47. Appeal And 
E r r o r s 842(1) 
PART V. DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY 
Cross References 
Arbitration in third party motor vehicle accident cases, discovery conducted in accordance with this 
part, see § 31A-22-321. 
RULE 26 . GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCOVERY 
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods. 
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2) 
and except as otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party shall, without 
awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties: 
(a)(1)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each 
individual likely to have discoverable information supporting its claims or 
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defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the subjects of the informa-
tion; 
(a)(1)(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all discover-
able documents, data compilations, and tangible things in the possession, 
custody, or control of the party supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely 
for impeachment; 
(a)(1)(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing 
party, making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 all 
discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on which such computa-
tion is based,-including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries 
suffered; and 
(a)(1)(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agree-
ment under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable 
to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the case or to 
indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1) shall be made within 14 days after the 
meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the 
parties or ordered by the court, a party joined after the meeting of the parties 
shall make these disclosures within 30 days after being served. A party shall 
make initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably available and 
is not excused from making disclosures because the party has not fully complet-
ed the investigation of the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency 
of another party's disclosures or because another party has not made disclo-
sures. 
(a)(2) Exemptions. 
(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do not 
apply to actions: 
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the plead-
ings is $20,000 or less; 
(a)(2)(A)(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making 
proceedings of an administrative agency; 
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C; 
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforce an arbitration award; 
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4; 
and 
(a)(2)(A)(vi) in which any party not admitted to the practice law in Utah is 
not represented by counsel. 
(a)(2)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under subpart 
(a)(1) are subject to discovery under subpart (b). 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
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(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who 
may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, 
this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially 
employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an 
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be accompa-
nied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or party. The 
report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to 
testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected 
to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the 
witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness within the 
preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; 
and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at 
trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, 
the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after 
the expiration of fact discovery as provided by subdivision (d) or, if the evidence 
is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter 
identified by another party under paragraph (3)(B), within 60 days after the 
disclosure made by the other party. 
(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the follow-
ing information regarding the evidence that it may present at trial other than 
solely for impeachment: 
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone 
number of each witness, separately identifying witnesses the party expects to 
present and witnesses the party may call if the need arises; 
(a)(4)(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be 
presented by means of a deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a 
transcript of the pertinent portions of the deposition testimony; and 
(a)(4)(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, 
including summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those which the 
party expects to offer and those which the party may offer if the need arises. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 days before 
trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is specified by the 
court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (i) any objections to the use 
under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated by another party under subpara-
graph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with the grounds therefor, that may 
be made to the admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C). 
Objections not so disclosed, other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be deemed waived unless excused by the 
court for good cause shown. 
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(a)(5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or 
ordered by the court, all disclosures under paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) shall be 
made in writing, signed and served. 
(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain discovery by 
one or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or 
written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or 
permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other 
purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission. 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the 
court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(b)(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery 
or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, descrip-
tion, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other 
tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of 
any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information 
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
(b)(2) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods 
set forth in Subdivision (a)(6) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: 
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtain-
able from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less 
expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by 
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the discovery is 
unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the impor-
tance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own 
initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c). 
(b)(3) Trial preparation: Materials, Subject to the provisions of Subdivision 
(b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible 
things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for 
that other party's representative (including the party's attorney, consultant, 
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party 
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the 
case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the 
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery 
of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall 
protect 'against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or 
legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the 
litigation. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the 
action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a 
person not a party may obtain without the required showing a statement 
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Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 701 
Note 6 
1015, 406 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2000 UT App 285, 
certiorari denied 20 P.3d 403. Evidence <$=> 
478(1) 
Mother was not unqualified to testify with 
respect to gestation period, since her estimation 
as to period of gestation was both rationally 
based upon her own perception and helpful to 
clear understanding of length of term of her 
child. Rules of Evid., Rule 56. Roods v. 
Roods, 1982, 645 P.2d 640. Evidence <3=> 
474(1) 
7. Product liability 
In products liability suit arising out of child's 
death on all-terrain vehicle, district court could 
exclude proffered testimony of decedent's moth-
er as to whether she would have allowed her 
son to ride vehicle had it had different warning 
on it. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 701(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 
Kloepfer v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 1990, 898 
F.2d 1452. Evidence <£=> 501(9) 
8. Performance or breach of contract 
In buyer's counterclaim for breach of warran-
ty in conditional seller's action to replevy bread-
RULES OF EVIDENCE 
slicing and bread-wrapping machines, testimo-
ny as to amount of paper wasted because of 
rewraps necessary, or as to number of "crip-
ples" per day produced by machine, held not 
inadmissible as matters of opinion or conclu-
sions. Battle Creek Bread Wrapping Mach. Co. 
v. Paramount Baking Co., 1934, 88 Utah 67, 39 
P.2d323. Evidenced 471(25) 
9. Review 
Admission of alleged lay and expert handwrit-
ing evidence to challenge easement conveyance 
document certified by a notary public allegedly 
acting as a "subscribing witness" was not plain 
error, as any error would not have been obvious 
to the trial court; statute did not define "sub-
scribing witness," notary could not state with 
certainty that she personally witnessed the exe-
cution of the deed, and Supreme Court case 
which held that a notary who personally wit-
nesses the execution of a deed may be a sub-
scribing witness was only case to address issue 
in over 100 years. Berkshires, L.L.C. v. Sykes, 
2005, 541 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 2005 WL 3434444. 
Appeal And Error &* 204(7) 
RULE 702 . TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Advisory Committee Note 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
Rule 56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), 
was substantially the same. 
Cross References 
Disclosure of witnesses to be used at trial, see Rules Civ. Proa, Rule 26. 
Law Review and Journal Commentaries 
Anderson, United States v. Azure: Admissibility 
of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse 
Cases, 15 J. Contemp. L. 285 (1989). 
Breyer, The Battered Woman Syndrome and 
the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Utah, 5 
UtahBJ. 16 (March 1992). 
Hale, Eyewitness Identification in Utah: A 
Changing Perspective, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 113 
(1988). 
Lewis and Knight-Eagan, "Making New Law 
With a Joyous Frenzy "-The State of the Law on 
Expert Testimony in Utah, 3 Utah BJ. 14 (June/ 
July 1990). 
Mundt-Larsh, State v. Rimmasch: Utah's 
Threshold Admissibility Standard for Child Sex-
ual Abuse Profile Evidence, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 
641 (1990). 
Poulter, Daubert and Scientific Evidence: As-
sessing Evidentiary Reliability in Toxic Tort Liti-
gation, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 1307 (1993). 
Recent developments in Utah law: III. Evi-
dence law. Distinguishing between expert and 
lay testimony, 2005 Utah L. Rev. 230 (2005). 
Schofield, A Misapplication of Daubert: Comp-
ton v. Subaru of America Opens the Gate for 
Unreliable and Irrelevant Testimony, 1997 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 489 (1997). 
Walden, United States v. Downing: Novel Sci-
entific Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 
Utah L. Rev. 839 (1986). 
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EXHIBIT 2 
Ruling on Motions in Limine 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
STRONG & HANNI 
Robert L. Janicki, #5493 
Peter H. Christensen, # 5453 
Steven T. Densley, #8171 
Attorneys for Defendant, Columbia Steel 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Tel: (801) 532-7080 
Fax: (801) 596-1508 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SERGIO PRUNEDA AND IRIS PRUNED A, 
AS PARENTS AND GUARDIANS OF 
ANTHONY GUERRERO, DONOVAN 
GUERRERO, SERGIO PRUNEDA, JR., 
COZY PRUNEDA, MATTHEW PRUNEDA 
AND ZENNIA PRUNEDA, MINOR 
CHILDREN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
COLUMBIA STEEL CASGINT CO., INC., 
AN OREGON CORPORATOIN AND 
RICHARD D. GRAY, 
Defendants. 
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONS 
IN LIMINE REGARDING 
DEFENDANT'S EXPERTS, PAUL 
FRANCE AND DR. JAYNE CLARK 
Civil No.: 030402552 
Honorable Fred D. Howard 
On May 20, 2005, oral argument was heard on Plaintiffs' Motions in Limine regarding 
Defendant's experts, Paul France and Dr. Jayne Clark. Having heard oral argument and 
reviewing the memoranda filed by the parties, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
;r°/°3 * n Deputy 
1. Defendant's Motion in Limine regarding expert Paul France is denied. However, 
the Court will allow the Plaintiffs to conduct an evidentiary hearing at the trial, out of the 
presence of the jury, regarding the foundation for Paul France's opinions. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion in Limine regarding Defendant's expert, Dr. Jayne Clark, is 
denied. 
3. The Court will hold a telephone scheduling conference on July 15, 2005 at 8:30 at 
which time a date will be set for a three day jury trial. 
DATED this ^ 9 day of June, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: \Y IN, 
Honorable Fred D 
Fourth District Co 
^?*S<fUP.$ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
J?'/ 
^J'/<tt? 
Mel S. Martin 
Edward T. Wells 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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EXHIBIT 3 
Special Verdict 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Coi 
of Utah County, State of 0 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SERGIO PRUNEDA AND IRIS PRUNED A, 
AS PARENTS AND GUARDIANS OF 
ANTHONY GUERRERO, DONOVAN 
GUERRERO, SERGIO PRUNEDA, JR., 
COZY PRUNEDA, MATTHEW PRUNEDA 
AND ZENNIA PRUNEDA, MINOR 
CHILDREN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
COLUMBIA STEEL CASTING CO., INC., 
AN OREGON CORPORATION AND 
RICHARD D. GRAY, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No.: 030402552 
Honorable Fred D. Howard 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of the evidence. If you find the 
evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes". If you find the evidence so 
equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the 
evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer "No". Any damages assessed must also 
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Was the defendant, Richard D. Gray, negligent as alleged by the plaintiffs? 
Yes No 
2. Was the negligence of Richard D. Gray a proximate cause of the injuries alleged by 
the plaintiffs? 
Yes t / ^ No 
If you answered questions 1 or 2 "No", do not proceed any further. Instead, have the foreman 
sign the Special Verdict and inform the bailiff that you have reached a verdict. If you answered 
"Yes" to questions 1 and 2, then, and only then, proceed to the next question. 
3. Was the plaintiff, Sergio Pruneda, contributorily negligent as alleged by the 
defendants? 
Yes No \f 
4. Was the negligence of Sergio Pruneda a proximate cause of the injuries alleged by 
the plaintiffs? 
Yes No 
5. Assuming all of the negligence that proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries to total 
100%, what percentage of that negligence is attributable to: 
a. Plaintiff, Sergio Pruneda % 
b. Defendant, Richard D. Gray % 
c. Total 100% 
2 
6.a. Did plaintiff, Sergio Pruneda, sustain reasonable and necessary medical expenses as 
a result of the automobile accident of July 31, 2002? 
Yes
 V X No 
6.b. If you answered question 6.a. "yes"> state the amount of special damages. 
Special Damages: $ ^ 7 (p 3 i Q"9 
If, and only if, the amount of special damages is $3,000 or more, then state the 
amount of general damages, if any, you award. 
General Damages: $_ 
7.a. Did plaintiff, Anthony Guerrero, sustain reasonable and necessary medical expenses 
as a result of the automobile accident of July 31, 2002? 
Yes 'X No 
7.b. If you answered question 7.a. "yes"> state the amount of special damages. 
Special Damages: $_ 
If, and only if, the amount of special damages is $3,000 or more, then state the 
amount of general damages, if any, you award. 
General Damages: $ ~~ "C/ ~~ 
8.a. Did plaintiff, Donovan Guerrero, sustain reasonable and necessary medical expenses 
as a result of the automobile accident of July 31, 2002? 
Yes y No 
3 
8.b. If you answered question 8.a. "yes", state the amount of special damages. 
C2D 
Special Damages: $__ 
If, and only if, the amount of special damages is $3,000 or more, then state the 
amount of general damages, if any, you award. 
General Damages: $_ 
9.a. Did plaintiff, Sergio Pruneda, Jr., sustain reasonable and necessary medical expenses 
as a result of the automobile accident of July 31, 2002? 
Yes No 
9.b. If you answered question 9.a. "yes", state the amount of special damages. 
Special Damages: $ U-ZSJ) 
If, and only if, the amount of special damages is $3,000 or more, then state the 
amount of general damages, if any, you award. 
General Damages: $ \3^ 
lO.a. Did plaintiff, Cozy Pruneda, sustain reasonable and necessary medical expenses as 
a result of the automobile accident of July 31, 2002? 
Yes / No 
lO.b. If you answered question 10.a. "yes", state the amount of special damages. 
Special Damages: $_ 
4 
If, and only if, the amount of special damages is $3,000 or more, then state the 
amount of general damages, if any, you award. 
General Damages: $__ 
11 .a. Did plaintiff, Matthew Pruneda, sustain reasonable and necessary medical expenses 
as a result of the automobile accident of July 31, 2002? 
Yes / No 
1 l.b. If you answered question 1 La. "yes"> state the amount of special damages. 
Special Damages: $ *Z uO 
12. Did plaintiff, Zennia Pruneda, sustain reasonable and necessary medical expenses as 
a result of the automobile accident of July 31, 2002? 
Yes V No 
12.b. If you answered question 12.a. "yes"> state the amount of special damages. 
Special Damages: $ 'u2x5 
DATED this 'Z-O day of April, 2006. 
O^orm/l 
Foreperson 
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EXHIBIT 4 
Judgment 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State ot U1ar 
stz&loQ M Deput\ 
Edward T. Wells, (Bar No. 3422) 
Mel S. Martin (Bar No. 2102) 
MEL S. MARTIN, P.C. 
5282 South Commerce Drive, #D-292 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)284-7278 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
SERGIO PRUNEDA, and IRIS 
PRUNEDA as parent and guardian of 
DONOVAN GUERRERO, ANTHONY ' 
GUERRERO, SERGIO PRUNEDA, JR., ; 
COZY PRUNEDA, MATTHEW ; 
PRUNEDA, and ZENNIA PRUNEDA, ; 
Minor Children. ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. \ 
COLUMBIA STEEL CASTING CO., ) 
INC., an Oregon coiporation, and ] 
RICHARD D. GRAY, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 030402552 
) Judge Fred D. Howard 
This action was tried to a jury, the Honorable Fred D. Howard presiding, on April 
17-20, 2006. Plaintiffs were present and represented by their attorney, Edward T. Wells, and 
defendants were present and represented by their attorney, Peter H. Christensen. At the close of 
evidence, jury instructions and closing arguments, the jury entered a verdict answering questions 
as follows on the Special Verdict form: 
1. Was the Defendant Richard D. Gray, negligent as alleged by the plaintiffs? 
Yes X No 
2. Was the negligence of Richard D. Gray a proximate cause of the injuries 
alleged by the plaintiffs? 
Yes X No 
3. Was the plaintiff, Sergio Pruneda, contributorily negligent as alleged by 
the defendants? 
Yes No X 
4. Was the negligence of Sergio Pruneda a proximate cause of the injuries 
alleged by plaintiffs? 
Yes No 
5. Assuming all of the negligence that proximately caused the plaintiffs' 
injuries to total 100%, what percent of that negligence is attributable to : 
a. Plaintiff, Sergio Pruneda % 
b. Defendant, Richard D. Gray % 
c. Total 100% 
2 
6a. Did plaintiff, Sergio Pruneda, sustain reasonable and necessary medical 
expenses as a result of the automobile accident of July 31, 2002? 
Yes _X_ No 
6b. If you answered question 6a "Yes", state the amount of special damages. 
Special Damages: $4,762.07. 
If, and only if, the amount of special damages is $3,000 or more, then state the 
amount of general damages, if any, you award. 
General Damages: $J) 
7a. Did plaintiff, Anthony Guerrero, sustain reasonable and necessary medical 
expenses as a result of the automobile accident of July 31, 2002? 
Yes _2L_ No 
7b. If you answered question 6a "Yes", state the amount of special damages. 
Special Damages: $220.00. 
If, and only if, the amount of special damages is $3,000 or more, then state the 
amount of general damages, if any, you award. 
General Damages: $ 
8a. Did plaintiff, Donovan Guerrero, sustain reasonable and necessary medical 
expenses as a result of the automobile accident of July 31, 2002? 
Yes X No 
3 
8b. If you answered question 6a "Yes", state the amount of special damages. 
Special Damages: $220.00. 
If, and only if, the amount of special damages is $3,000 or more, then state the 
amount of general damages, if any, you award. 
General Damages: $ 
9a. Did plaintiff, Sergio Pruneda, Jr., sustain reasonable and necessary 
medical expenses as a result of the automobile accident of July 31, 2002? 
Yes J L No 
9b. If you answered question 6a "Yes", state the amount of special damages. 
Special Damages: $220.00. 
If, and only if, the amount of special damages is $3,000 or more, then state the 
amount of general damages, if any, you award. 
General Damages: $ 
10a. Did plaintiff, Cozy Pruneda, sustain reasonable and necessary medical 
expenses as a result of the automobile accident of July 31, 2002? 
Yes _X_ No 
10b. If you answered question 6a "Yes", state the amount of special damages. 
Special Damages: $220.00. 
4 
1 la. Did plaintiff, Matthew Pruneda, sustain reasonable and necessary medical 
expenses as a result of the automobile accident of July 31, 2002? 
Yes J L No 
1 lb. If you answered question 6a "Yes", state the amount of special damages. 
Special Damages: $220.00. 
12a. Did plaintiff, Zennia Pruneda, sustain reasonable and necessary medical 
expenses as a result of the automobile accident of July 31, 2002? 
Yes JL No 
12b. If you answered question 6a "Yes", state the amount of special damages. 
Special Damages: $220.00. 
The special verdict was returned, dated and signed by the jury foreman. 
Th€ jury was polkd, indicating the-vefdret-was-unanimQUS.- Over thc-ubjeitiun of ^X: 
-Ihc plaintiffs, the jury was released. 
The court finds that plaintiff is entitled to recover prejudgment interest pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-44 on special damages actually incurred as assessed by the jury 
herein at the statutory rate often percent (10%) per annum from the date of injury (July 31, 2002) 
to the date of entry of judgment. 
5 
The court further finds that interest at ten percent per annum from July 31, 2002 
on the jury's award of special damages incurred by Sergio Pruneda, in the sum of $4762.07 
through April 24, 2006, is the amount of $1,778.28. 
The court further finds that interest at ten percent per annum from July 31, 2002 
on the jury's award of special damages incurred by Donovan Guerrero, Anthony Guerrero, Sergio 
Pruneda Jr., Cozy Pruneda, Matthew Pruneda and Zennia Pruneda, in the sum of $220.00 each, 
through April 25, 2006, is the sum of $82.15 each. 
The parties stipulated at trial that any amount awarded against defendant Richard 
D. Gray, would also be entered against defendant Columbia Steel Casting Company. 
NOW, THEREFORE, judgment is entered against defendants and in favor of 
plaintiffs as follows: 
1. Judgment is entered against defendants and in favor of plaintiff, Sergio 
Pruneda in the amount of $4,762.07, together with prejudgment interest pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-27-44 in the sum of $1,778.28 for a total judgment in favor of Sergio Pruneda of 
$6,540.35. 
2. Judgment is entered against defendants and in favor of plaintiffs, Donovan 
Guerrero, Anthony Guerrero, Sergio Pruneda Jr., Cozy Pruneda, Matthew Pruneda and Zennia 
Pruneda in the amount of $220.00 each, together with prejudgment interest pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-27-44 in the sum of $82.15 each for a total judgment in favor of Donovan 
6 
Guerrero, Anthony Guerrero, Sergio Pruneda Jr., Cozy Pruneda, Matthew Pruneda and Zennia 
Pruneda of $1,812.90. 
3. The total Judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants is the sum 
of$8,353.25 
4. Costs are awarded to plaintiff in the amount of $ 3f /6?2> , <5"^) 
Said judgment to accrue interest and be subject to costs of collection of the 
A 
judgment from the date of judgment until paid in full. 
Dated this ^ p day of * ^ 2 / S y ^ 2006. 
Honprable Fred D^Howaj 
District Judge 
Approved as to Form 
Peter H. Christensen, Attorney for Defendants 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of April, 2006,1 caused to be mailed by 
first-class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to 
Peter H. Christensen 
Strong & Hanni 
3 Triad Center, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Copy Faxed to (801) 596-1508 
C ' • 
<r 
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EXHIBIT 5 
Unredacted Medical Records 
MCCLEAN CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC 
PATIENT NOTES 
GORDON M MCCLEAN, JRDC, DABCO 
PATIENT: Anthony Pruneda DOB: 1/6/92 
Resolved lumbar sprain grade I 
Assessment: 
It appears that this patient has reached MMI for injuries related 
to the automobile accident of July 31, 2002 and will be released 
from care with no residuals. GMM 
PRUANT0020 
MCCLEAN CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC 
PATIENT NOTES 
GORDON M. MCCLEAN, JR. D.C., DABCO 
PATIENT: Donavan Pruneda DOB: 12/05/90 
Examination: 
DTRs were 2 symmetrically in the upper extremities. Cervical ROM 
was wnl. Jackson's test was negative right and left. Shoulder 
Depression test was negative right and left. Cervical Compression 
test was negative right and left. Palpation was negative for pain 
in the cervical and thoracic regions. Myospasm was also negative 
in the cervical and thoracic regions. Percussion was negative in 
the cervical and thoracic regions. Muscle strength was 5/5 for 
the upper extremities. Sensory tests were normal for the upper 
extremities. In the lumbar region, DTRs were 2 symmetrically for 
the lower extremities. SLR was negative right and left. 
Bechterew's test was negative right and left. Milgrams test was 
negative. Minor's Sign was negative. Kemp's test was negative 
right and left. Heel Walk and Toe Walk were negative right and 
left. Palpation was normal in the lumbar region. Myospasm was 
negative in the lumbar region. Percussion was negative in the 
lumbar region. Lumbar ROM was normal. Muscle strength was 5/5 for 
the lower extremities. Sensory tests were normal for the lower 
extremities. 
Diagnosis Update: 
Resolved cervical sprain grade II 
Resolved thoracic sprain grade I 
Resolved lumbar sprain grade I 
Plan: 
Patient has reached MMI for injuries related to the automobile 
accident of July 31, 2002 and will be released from care with no 
residuals or partial permanent impairment. GMM 
PRUDON0021 
MCCLEAN CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC 
PATIENT NOTES 
GORDON M. MCCLEAN, JR. D.C., DABCO 
PATIENT: Pruneda Cozy DOB: 0 6 / 2 3 / 9 6 
0 4 / 0 2 / 0 3 
Patient is doing about the same as last visit. CTO GMM 
04/04/03 
Patient reports mild thoracolumbar discomfort especially if 
sitting for long periods of time. Palpation is mildly tender in 
the paraspinal regions. CTO GMM 
04/28/03 
Patient is doing well with minimal discomfort in the 
thoracolumbar region. Patient is able to perform normal ADLs with 
little discomfort. He reports sitting will sometimes make him a 
little stiff and sore; otherwise he is doing well. Palpation is 
minimally tender on right thoracolumbar paraspinal muscles. Mild 
end point tenderness on lumbar extension. See in two weeks. CTO 
GMM 
05/12/03 
Patient reports he is feeling good with no particular pain but 
just a little tightness in between the scapula today. Sitting 
will occasionally irritate the region. 
Examination: 
Cervical ROM is normal. Palpation is not tender in the cervical 
region or thoracic region. No myospasm is present in the cervical 
or thoracic regions. Cervical Orthopedic tests were negative. In 
the lumbar region palpation was negative Ll-5. No parapsinal 
myospasm was noted. DTRs were 2 symmetrically for the lower 
extremities. Orthopedic tests such as SLR and Bechterews were 
negative right and left. Lumbar ROM of was within normal limits 
with no end point tenderness. Muscle strength was 5/5 for the 
lower extremities. Sensory tests were normal for the lower 
extremities. 
Diagnosis Update: 
Resolved cervical sprain grade II 
Resolved thoracic sprain grade I 
Resolved lumbar sprain grade I 
Assessment: 
Overall, the patient is doing well with no particular symptoms. 
He is able to perform normal activities of daily living. The 
patient has reached MMI for injuries related to the automobile 
accident on July 31, 2003 and will be released from care with no 
residuals. GMM 
PRUCOZ0019 
MCCLEAN CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC 
PATIENT NOTES 
GORDON M MCCLEEAN, JR D.C , DABCO 
PATIENT: Matthew Pruneda DOB: 03/23/94 
11/25/02 
Similar symptoms as to last visit, CTO GMM 
12/09/02 
Patient is doing well with no particular problems. Palpation is 
not tender in the cervical or thoracic regions. Cervical ROM is 
wnl. 
Assessment: 
Patient has reached MMI for injuries related to the auto accident 
with no residuals. 
Plan: 
Release patient from care for injuries related to the auto 
accident. CTO GMM 
PRUMAT0015 
EXHIBIT (> 
F.R.C.P Rule 26 excerpt ot 
committee comments to 1993 
amendments 
M L JUDICIAL 
CEDURE and RUL 
Rule 26 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
ics, this assistance may be needed. Nevertheless, the report, 
which is intended to set forth the substance of the direct 
examination, should be written in a manner that reflects the 
testimony to be given by the witness and it must be signed 
by the witness. 
The report is to disclose the data and other information 
considered by the expert and any exhibits or charts that 
summarize or support the expert's opinions. Given this 
obligation of disclosure, litigants should no longer be able to 
argue that materials furnished to their experts to be used in 
forming their opinions—whether or not ultimately relied 
upon by the expert—are privileged or otherwise protected 
from disclosure when such persons are testifying or being 
deposed. 
Revised subdivision (b)(4)(A) authorizes the deposition of 
expert witnesses. Since depositions of experts required to 
prepare a written report may be taken only after the report 
has been served, the length of the deposition of such experts 
should be reduced, and in many cases the report may elimi-
nate the need for a deposition. Revised subdivision (e)(1) 
requires disclosure of any material changes made in the 
opinions of an expert from whom a report is required, 
whether the changes are in the written report or in testimo-
ny given at a deposition. 
For convenience, this rule and revised Rule 30 continue to 
use the term "expert" to refer to those persons who will 
testify under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence with 
respect to scientific, technical, and other specialized matters. 
The requirement of a written report in paragraph (2)(B), 
however, applies only to those experts who are retained or 
specially employed to provide such testimony in the case or 
whose duties as an employee of a party regularly involve the 
giving of such testimony. A treating physician, for example, 
can be deposed or called to testify at trial without any 
requirement for a written report. By local rule, order, or 
written stipulation, the requirement of a written report may 
be waived for particular experts or imposed upon additional 
persons who will provide opinions under Rule 702. 
Paragraph (3). This paragraph imposes an additional 
duty to disclose, without any request, information customari-
ly needed in final preparation for trial. These disclosures 
are to be made in accordance with schedules adopted by the 
court under Rule 16(b) or by special order. If no such 
schedule is directed by the court, the disclosures are to be 
made at least 30 days before commencement of the trial. By 
its terms, rule 26(a)(3) does not require disclosure of evi-
dence to be used solely for impeachment purposes; however, 
disclosure of such evidence—as well as other items relating 
to conduct of trial—may be required by local rule or a 
pretrial order. 
Subparagraph (A) requires the parties to designate the 
persons whose testimony they may present as substantive 
evidence at trial, whether in person or by deposition. Those 
who will probably be called as witnesses should be listed 
separately from those who are not likely to be called but who 
are being listed in order to preserve the right to do so if 
needed because of developments during trial. Revised Rule 
37(c)(1) provides that only persons so listed may be used at 
trial to present substantive evidence. This restriction does 
not apply unless the omission was "without substantial justi-
fication" and hence would not bax an unlisted witness if the 
need for such testimony is based upon developments during 
Complete Annotation Mat 
trial that could not reasonably have been anticipated—e.g., 
change of testimony. 
Listing a witness does not obligate the party to secure t 
attendance of the person at trial, but should preclude t 
party from objecting if the person is called to testify 1 
another party who did not list the person as a witnei 
Subparagraph (B) requires the party to indicate which 
these potential witnesses will be presented by deposition 
trial. A party expecting to use at trial a deposition n 
recorded by stenographic means is required by revised Ri 
32 to provide the court with a transcript of the pertine 
portions of such depositions. This rule requires that copi 
of the transcript of a nonstenographic deposition be provid 
to other parties in advance of trial for verification, an obvio 
concern since counsel often utilize their own personnel 
prepare transcripts from audio or video tapes. By order 
local rule, the court may require that parties designate t 
particular portions of stenographic depositions to be used 
trial. 
Subparagraph (C) requires disclosure of exhibits, includi 
summaries (whether to be offered in lieu of other document 
ry evidence or to be used as an aid in understanding su 
evidence), that may be offered as substantive evidence. T 
rule requires a separate listing of each such exhibit, thougr 
should permit voluminous items of a similar or standardiz 
character to be described by meaningful categories. F 
example, unless the court has otherwise directed, a series 
vouchers might be shown collectively as a single exhibit w 
their starting and ending dates. As with witnesses, 1 
exhibits that will probably be offered are to be listed se} 
rately from those which are unlikely to be offered but wh 
are listed in order to preserve the right to do so if neec 
because of developments during trial. Under revised R1 
37(c)(1) the court can permit use of unlisted documents 1 
need for which could not reasonably have been anticipated 
advance of trial. 
Upon receipt of these final pretrial disclosures, otl 
parties have 14 days (unless a different time is specified 
the court) to disclose any objections they wish to preserve 
the usability of the deposition testimony or to the admissit 
ty of the documentary evidence (other than under Rules < 
and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence). Similar pre 
sions have become commonplace either in pretrial orders 
by local rules, and significantly expedite the presentation 
evidence at trial, as well as eliminate the need to h 
available witnesses to provide "foundation" testimony 
most items of documentary evidence. The listing of a pot 
tial objection does not constitute the making of that object 
or require the court to rule on the objection; rather 
preserves the right of the party to make the objection w 
and as appropriate during trial. The court may, howe^  
elect to treat the listing as a motion "in limine" and rule u 
the objections in advance of trial to the extent appropri. 
The time specified in the rule for the final pretrial dis 
sures is relatively close to the trial date. The objective ii 
eliminate the time and expense in making these disclosi 
of evidence and objections in those cases that settle sho 
before trial, while affording a reasonable time for f 
preparation for trial in those cases that do not settle, 
many cases, it will be desirable for the court in a schedu 
or pretrial order to set an earlier time for disclosures 
evidence and provide more time for disclosing poter 
objections. 
als, see Title 28 U.S.C.A. 
For convenience, this rule and revised Rule 30 continue to 
use the term "expert" to refer to those persons who will 
testify under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence with 
respect to scientific, technical, and other specialized matters. 
The requirement of a written report in paragraph (2)(B), 
however, applies only to those experts who are retained or 
specially employed to provide such testimony in the case or 
whose duties as an employee of a party regularly involve the 
giving of such testimony. A treating physician, for example, 
can be deposed or called to testify at trial without any 
requirement for a written report. By local rule, order, or 
written stipulation, the requirement of a written report may 
be waived for particular experts or imposed upon additional 
persons who will provide opinions under Rule 702. 
